Graf Karl Ludwig von Grünne^[1]

1808 - 1884  (75 years)    Has more than 100 ancestors and 11 descendants in this family tree.

• Name	Karl Ludwig von Grünne
  Prefix	Graf
  Birth	25 Aug 1808	Wien, Österreich
  Gender	Male
  Death	15 Jun 1884	Baden, Baden-Württemberg, Deutschland
  Person ID	I596314	Geneagraphie
  Last Modified	16 Apr 2008

  
  

  Father	Philipp Ferdinand Wilhelm Hemricourt de Mozet de Pinchart,   b. 15 May 1762, Dresden, Sachsen, Deutschland d. 26 Jan 1854 (Age 91 years)
  Mother	Rosalie de Feltz,   b. 10 Feb 1779, Brussel, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest, België d. Yes, date unknown
  Marriage	28 Sep 1801	Brussel, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest, België
  Family ID	F262987	Group Sheet  |  Family Chart

  
  

  Family	Gräfin Caroline von und zu Trauttmansdorff-Weinsberg,   b. 29 Feb 1808, Wien, Österreich d. 19 Mar 1866, Wien, Österreich (Age 58 years)
  Marriage	16 May 1831	Wien, Österreich
  Children	1. Gräfin Karoline von Grünne,   b. 5 Jul 1832, Wien, Österreich d. Yes, date unknown   2. Graf Philipp von Grünne,   b. 4 Nov 1833, Wien, Österreich d. Yes, date unknown + 3. Gräfin Marianne von Grünne,   b. 8 Jul 1835, Wien, Österreich d. 24 Aug 1906, Alt Münster, OÖsterr. (Age 71 years)   4. Graf Ferdinand Jules Friedrich Karl von Grünne,   b. 2 Nov 1836   d. Yes, date unknown   5. Graf Rudolph Ferdinand Charles von Grünne,   b. 19 Sep 1838   d. Yes, date unknown   6. Gräfin Therese Hemricourt de Mozet de Pinchart,   b. 1 Aug 1840, Zatec d. Yes, date unknown
  Family ID	F258543	Group Sheet  |  Family Chart
  Last Modified	16 Apr 2008

  
  

• Event Map	Click to hide
  		Birth - 25 Aug 1808 - Wien, Österreich Marriage - 16 May 1831 - Wien, Österreich Death - 15 Jun 1884 - Baden, Baden-Württemberg, Deutschland  = Link to Google Earth
  Pin Legend	: Address       : Location       : City/Town       : County/Shire       : State/Province       : Country       : Not Set

  
  

• Photos

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• Notes

  When Karl's mother died in 1811, he and his two sisters found a home in the household of the Archduke Karl. Little is known about his youth, but the strict military atmosphere of the Archduke's household and the influence of his father would have been decisive for the development of his character. In 1828 when he was just twenty he entered the army. He was almost twenty-three when on 16 May 1831 he married Countess Caroline von Trauttmansdorff-Weinsberg. They had six children. He began his military career as a subaltern in the 3rd regiment of Ulans of the Archduke Karl. On 16 February 1829 he was promoted to full lieutenant with the 10th regiment of Hussars. On 2 July 1838 he became a captain of cavalry and was transferred to the 1st regiment of Ulans and attached to the Archduke Albrecht in the autumn of 1839 for the latter's journey to Russia. Archduke Albrecht wrote to Karl's father about the close friendship that had developed between him and young Karl. Karl also wrote from Moscow full of enthusiasm for the archduke. In December 1842 Karl was made lieutenant-colonel in the 7th Cheveauxlegers regiment. On 23 December 1843 he was made colonel in the 2nd regiment of Hussars. At this time he left the army to enter the service of the Court. He was appointed head chamberlain to the Archduke Stephen, the governor of Bohemia. When the archduke succeeded his father to become Palatine of Hungary in 1847, Karl Grünne followed him as his head chamberlain. He was soon to meet his future Lord and Emperor. Emperor Ferdinand appointed the young Archduke Franz to represent him at the installation of the new Palatine in Pressburg on 12 November 1847. There was general enthusiasm among those present over the address by the archduke, delivered in perfect Hungarian. Soon Grünne, out of his loyalty to the emperor, could no longer agree with the political position taken by the Palatine. He left the service of the archduke as the latter fell ever more under the influence of the Hungarian radicals. However, the personal good relations between Grünne and the archduke remained unimpaired. In June 1848, aged 39, Grünne became head chamberlain to the 18-year-old Archduke Franz. Although far from a position of power at Court, Grünne from the outset showed qualities of energy, tact, thoroughness and initiative which made him an ideal mediator in a number of difficult situations and quickly won him the confidence of the entire royal household. As an early assignment he was sent in September 1848 to mediate on behalf of the Court between the Archduke Stephen and field marshal Jellacic, the Ban of Croatia. Jellacic had been ordered to put down the movement for independence in Hungary, led by Kossuth and the Revolutionary Party. The archduke was in a difficult situation for, as Palatine, he was head of government of a country under threat from the emperor's senior field marshal. He sought the support of the emperor for his position and requested that Jellacic be ordered to halt his advance. Both sides consulted Grünne, who supported Jellacic, but achieved an outcome that, while suppressing the revolt, was lenient to the Hungarians to ease their return to the fold. Grünne was next involved on behalf of the Court in negotiations to put an end to the October 1848 uprising in Vienna. Although not actively involved in the early stages of the 'conspiracy' to replace the Emperor Ferdinand with his young nephew, the Archduke Franz, Grünne became a key figure in the final preparations. He drafted all the key documents and proclamations. As some of these were signed merely 'Franz', they were not issued until after it had been decided to add 'Joseph' to the young Emperor's name; consequently these documents had to be signed again by him. In April 1849 Grünne became deeply involved in Franz Joseph's decision to recall field marshal Prince Alfred Windisch-Graetz from command of the forces charged with putting down the revolution in Hungary. His contacts among the Hungarian nobility, within the Austrian Army and even among Windisch-Graetz's own officers, all urged him to intervene with the emperor on the basis that the field marshal had lost the initiative and the situation was in an unstable stalemate. Windisch-Graetz was unaware of Grünne's role and remained on friendly terms with him. However, Windisch-Graetz was clearly hurt by his recall after decades of loyal service to the Crown, culminating in his key role in the accession of the young emperor. It became Grünne's task over some years to mollify the old soldier's feelings while protecting the emperor from the avalanche of advice and admonition emanating from Windisch-Graetz. In April and May 1849 Grünne was deeply involved in the decision to seek Russian help in suppressing the uprising in Hungary. In this he effectively countered the advice of minister-president Prince Schwarzenberg (the brother-in-law of Windisch-Graetz) against Russian intervention. Grünne's intervention was unsuccessful in one tragic event of the Hungarian campaign. Field marshal Haynau, Windisch-Graetz's replacement, believed he had the authority to hand out to the Hungarian insurgents what punishment he saw fit, including the death penalty. He was determined to hang the thirteen Hungarian generals who had led the uprising. Following a number of interventions to Franz Joseph on behalf of these men, pleading for their lives, Grünne was sent to Haynau to at least delay the executions until their cases could be reviewed. However, Haynau had bypassed Grünne's orders and carried out the executions. Although his intercession had failed, Hungary remained grateful to Grünne for his efforts and made him an honorary citizen of Arad where the executions had been carried out. The accession of the young Franz Joseph began with ten years of Absolutist rule over the Empire in sharp reaction to the upheaval of the revolutions in Vienna, Prague and Budapest. From the outset of his reign, Franz Joseph knew his own mind, and took advice only to the extent of its being consistent with the broad thrusts of his policies. His first step, with his decree of 30 April 1849, was to take overall command of his army. This meant that all troop movements had to be cleared with him, as had all promotions above staff-officer and the disposition of all war materials. To give effect to this he created a Military Central Chancellery and appointed Grünne its first head as his adjutant-general and first adjutant-general of the army. Grünne was then forty. During the early 1850's the army was significantly reorganised under Grünne. The lines of command and responsibility were streamlined both within the army and between it and the minister for war. The ministry was wound up and the minister's responsibility considerably reduced. The Military Central Chancellery dealt with all military strategic issues, including all matters referred to it by the emperor, and oversighted army-conditions of service. All decisions, rules and orders were promulgated by the first adjutant-general 'On Highest Authority'. No action could be carried out without his signature and only he had the right to sign in the emperor's name. The reorganisation of the army was only partly carried through, as it was significantly impeded by the large troop reductions of 1853, 1855 and 1858, which despite Grünne's objections, were pushed through to relieve the parlous state of the Austrian economy. Therefore the army's problems of organisation could not be resolved as quickly as the emperor and Grünne had wished. Discontent over the reforms, especially over the lengthened period of service, focused on Grünne, though much had been done in his name by others. It is certain that, in his key position, Grünne had the closest insight into all military (and political) matters. It might have been expected that he would have exercised extraordinary power, but paradoxically this was never to be the case. This can only be understood in terms of the very strong, direct exercise of power by the young emperor, and Grünne's relationship with him. Karl Grünne became the emperor's adjutant-general because there was no one in the immediate circle of Franz Joseph and his family, in the traumatic times leading to his succession, who was more trusted. As well, their views and approaches were very similar. Franz Joseph used Grünne as a counterweight to his liberal ministers, whose philosophical stance he largely did not share. Theirs was a strong friendship to be unmatched again between the emperor and one of his subjects. Grünne genuinely admired the emperor and loved him like a son. The emperor would visit him almost daily and discussed the most crucial matters of state with him. Hence Grünne was mentor to Franz Joseph in the key formative stage of his long reign, and the emperor was to show extraordinary loyalty to him throughout his life. Contrary to the account of many histories of this time, it is a fact that Grünne also enjoyed a close friendship with the Empress Elisabeth, forged at the outset by their mutual love of riding and horses. He became her mentor and confidant as well as the emperor's. Until about 1862 many letters from Elisabeth still in Dobersberg testify to the genuine warmth between them. As Elisabeth withdrew increasingly from the emperor and the Court, Grünne found himself drawn even more into his familiar role of mediator. He was sent by the emperor to her in Corfu in June 1861 as his emissary. The cause of the final rift between Grünne and the empress is not known, but probably stemmed from a crucial intercession by him on the emperor's behalf, or at least some decisive move by him to side with the emperor. As Elisabeth had confided in Grünne, she may well have felt betrayed. After the sudden death of Karl Schwarzenberg in April 1852, Franz Joseph decided not to replace him as minister-president and he himself took on the primary role in cabinet. Schwarzenberg's death was a tragic loss with long-term consequences, as his powerful personality was no longer there to keep the other ministers in check and to guide the young emperor. Grünne's poor relationships with Franz Joseph's ministers are well documented; they were jealous of his close relationship with the emperor, which led to the rejection of many of their proposals. As the Crimean crisis unfolded in 1854, Grünne strongly favoured retaining the monarchy's friendship with Russia. Like all Austrian conservatives, he saw Russia as the last conservative power to which the monarchy could turn in the battle against the drive for independence by the various nationalities. In this he found himself out of step with Franz Joseph, who began to turn increasingly against Russia under the influence of the liberal ministers, Bach and Buol. They alienated Russia without satisfying the Western powers. This set the climate for the final disaster of the absolutist phase of Franz Joseph's reign, the Italian campaign of 1859. Quoting his evidence of the advanced preparations of the Sardinian and French armies, Grünne argued strongly and repeatedly between January and March 1859 for a major build-up of the Austrian Second Army stationed in Italy. He was strenuously opposed by Buol who rejected the prospect that France would intervene for Sardinia, and by Bach who argued that the economy could not cope with the cost of a troop build-up. The emperor sided with them. A remarkable turnabout occurred at the ministerial conference of 6 April 1859. The ministers who had consistently resisted all proposals for expansion of the army now argued that the right strategic moment was at hand for delivery of an Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia. Its expected rejection would create the circumstance for Austria to defeat Piedmont quickly before the French could intervene on its behalf. Grünne saw the greatest danger for Austria from such a move, given the relative lack of preparedness of the Austrian army in Italy, and argued strenuously against such a step until a build-up of that Army had been completed. The emperor decided that the ultimatum should be sent to Sardinia, but that a troop build-up should only be approved if France declared for Piedmont. Grünne showed understandable reluctance to take responsibility for finding a military solution to what he saw as a foreign policy disaster which would leave Austria completely isolated and militarily unprepared. The ultimatum had been sent at the worst possible moment. If the emperor had taken his advice the later catastrophe of the defeat of Magenta might have been averted. Grünne has been blamed for the choice of Gyulai to lead the Austrian forces. His appointment as Commander in Chief in Italy, to replace Radetzky following his retirement, had occurred in 1857; and his credentials, in an army that had not fought a major conflict for many years, had seemed excellent. However he was patently inadequate for the task. Recognising this himself, he pleaded with the emperor to appoint a senior commander over him. However, this was not done. In hindsight it should have been, though it is far from clear with whom. After the slaughter of Magenta on 17 June 1859, the emperor himself took command of the First and Second Armies. Given his complete inexperience in the leadership of large forces in battle, this did nothing to counter the succession of tactical blunders that culminated in the defeat at Solferino later that month. Although Grünne accompanied the emperor, he neither sought, nor had any significant influence upon the conduct of the campaign. He recognised that his strengths were not those of a chief-of-staff, and did not attempt to influence operational issues. The events of 1859 are fully documented in the histories of the monarchy. They marked the end of the absolutist phase of Franz Joseph's rule. The demand for change was overwhelming and to his great credit he embraced it. At the news of the surrender at Solferino, the public demand for Grünne's dismissal was intense. Grünne himself pleaded to be released but the emperor refused. Grünne continued at his post until October when he again requested release from his position. This time Franz Joseph reluctantly agreed but appointed him his master of the horse and awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen. At this point Karl Grünne left the stage of Austrian history, though without losing the favour of his monarch. In 1864 he was appointed general of cavalry. In 1865 he became patron of the 1st Regiment of Ulans and was awarded the Order of the Golden Fleece. Until his death Grünne managed the emperor's private finances and, until 1871, administered the emperor's private properties of Prater and Krieau. In 1875 he requested the emperor's permission to retire. He lived the rest of his life with his family at Dobersberg, Lower Austria, but spent long periods at Baden when his health failed. The emperor visited him there several times.

  
  

• Sources

  [S1837] Verheecke, José, Die Vorfahren von Christina von Reibnitz, (http://users.pandora.be/jose.verheecke1).