Search | Advanced Search | Search Families | Search Site

First Name:   Last Name:   ID:  

War and society in East Central Europe
Volume XXXV

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
AND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE;
1848-1849
A Military History

Edited by Gabor Bona

Translated by Nora Arato

Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado
Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.
Highland Lakes, New Jersey

Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York
1999

Starting in the fall of 1848, in addition to the main military branches all the other necessary "military bodies" were established. Three battalions of sappers and a bridge company were organized for engineering duties. The Army Transportation Corps was established to fulfill the needs of transportation and artillery traction. The honved general staff, engineer corps, military court, quartermaster corps, military medical corps, and military chaplaincy were also established. Military handbooks and regulations were published to offer theoretical (strategic as well as tactical) and practical help to the honved army and to the operation of different military service branches. These books, with some adjustments to the Hungarian and revolutionary situation, were translations of handbooks and regulations used by the Imperial-Royal Army.
The composition of the army effectives was an approximate reflection of the country. 80-85% of the soldiers were of peasant origin and primarily from among the have-nots. City dwellers were represented by the lower classes as well. Law students, who were mentioned above in connection with the first ten honved battalions, were prominent in the troops formed during the fall of 1848. They joined the artillery in large numbers and, owing to the technical background of these former students, honved artillery soon became well-respected even by the imperial forces. Even though factual figures are lacking, estimates based on new recruiting quotas, the nationality distribution of the population within country, and infor mation about established units indicate that about 40% of the approximately 200,000 honved soldiers belonged to non-Hungarian ethnicities. The Slovaks contributed 30,000 soldiers while the Romanians of Hungary, together with those of Transylvania joining during the spring of 1849, contributed about 25,000 honveds to the Hungarian Honved Army. Germans, excluding Transylvanian Saxons, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians, and Catholic Serbs of the Southern Region, became honveds in substantial numbers. The Jews, whose legal exclusion in Hungary was terminated by the laws of 1848, joined the Honvedseg in significant numbers.
The officers' corps of the honved army was also varied. Its multi-national composition, however, rather resembled the officers' corps of the Imperial-Royal Army. In the summer of 1849 the German Graf Karl Leiningen-Westerburg, Lajos Aulich and Jozsef Schweidel (both Germans from Hungary), the Austrian Ernst Poelt Ritter von Poeltenberg, an Englishman of French origin Richard Guyon de Beaufre, the Croatian Karoly Knezic, and the Serb Janos Damjanich, all served in the corps of generals of the honved army along with Hungarians. In addition, there were the three Poles: Bem, Dembinski, and Wysocki.

The new campaign started on October 28, led by Moga. The Hungarian troops advanced as far as the Schwechat Brook. The battle took place along that line on October 30. The Hungarian army of 27,000, divided into ten brigades, possessed 82 guns. Jellacic, on the other side, had 23 and l/2 battalions (about 25,000 soldiers), 37 cavalry companies (about 5,000 men), and 99 guns. Yet, the balance between the two sides was illusory. The majority of Jellacic's army consisted of seasoned troops with several years of experience, while half of the deployed Hungarian troops smelled gun-powder for the first time that day. The Meszaros military steamboat on the Danube helped to secure the Hungarian troops' flank.
On the right flank the volunteers of the English born Major Richard Guyon advanced on and occupied the village of Mannsworth. Following that, in the center, Gorgei's troops occupied the heights near Schwechat and his artillery started to fire at the village of Mannsworth. Gorgei was about to charge on the village when Moga instructed him to stop and to wait for the left wing led by Colonel Mihaly Repasy. Repasy's brigade united a significant part of the Hungarian cavalry which lagged behind, and Moga was justified to think that the imperial-royal troops would thrust into the gap created by their absence. However, as a result of Moga's command Gorgei's troops were exposed to cannon-fire in an open area. The balls of a twelve-pounder battery caused grave results: Gorgei's troops were shaken and fled and the same happened to the national guardsmen and volunteers positioned in the second line of the center. Their retreat was covered by the artillery and the hussars.
Jellacic's plan was to get to the rear of the Hungarians, along the bank of the Schwechat Brook, with the cavalry division led by Lieutenant General Liechtenstein. However, Liechtenstein was late and ran into Repasy's hussars and mounted artillery, who were also late. Thus, the Hungarian army reached the Leuthe River without significant losses. Even Windisch-Gratz commented on the behavior of Repasy's troops during the retreat saying: "This is not a riffraff rebellious mob. This is an army."
During the campaign to liberate Vienna it became known that Imperial-Royal Lieutenant General Balthasar Simunich was leading a strong brigade to invade Trencsen county via the Jablunka pass from Moravia. On October 28 at Kosztolna, Simunich's division of 5,000 defeated Hungarian troops made up mostly of national guardsmen led by Major Kalman Ordody. Very soon Simunich occupied Nagyszombat and was threatening Pozsony. Ordody's troops withdrew towards Lipotvar to prevent Simunich "to transform it into his own Szenttamas by occupation." After the Schwechat Battle Kossuth made arrangements so that Colonel Richard Guyon would have 8,000 men and 22 guns to be drawn from the troops arriving in Kopcseny, to try to capture Simunich's army. With reinforcements received in Pozsony, the force of about 10,000 men and 32 guns set out in pursuit of Simunich. According to the plans, the National Guard of Northern Hungarian counties and Ordody's troops would block Simunich's army and force it to lay down the arms. However, Guyon's troops were so exhausted that they could not be dispatched without a rest. Other Hungarian forces did not even make an attempt to block Simunich's movements fearing his overwhelming numerical superiority. Guyon's advance guard first reached the enemy at Nadas on November 3. The hussars destroyed the rear-guard at Jablonic the following day, on November 4. Unfortunately, Guyon's soldiers could not inflict any serious damage on Simunich's quickly retreating troops. As a result, Guyon's army returned to the eastern side of the Little Carpathians to take up position at Nadas.

In Transdanubia, considered to be the main theater of operations, military operations began with the advance of General Simunich's division. On December 14 this division made an assault on the brigade of the Upper Danubian Army Corps, which kept the Nadas pass, and drove them out after a short combat. This could have caused an unpleasant situation in that Simunich's continuing advance could have placed him next to the right flank of Gorgei's army corps gathering at Pozsony. In order to prevent that from happening Colonel Guyon and his brigade received the order to forge ahead towards Nagyszombat, to join Major Pal Ordody's brigade that had been driven out of the Nadas pass, and to halt Simunich's troops. Ordody, however, gratuitously broke off from the enemy and retreated into the Lipotvar fort. Therefore on December 16, Guyon and his brigade faced the enemy by themselves at Nagyszombat. During the battle Simunich's troops partially encircled Guyon's soldiers within the town. This became evident for the Hungarians when the imperial troops opened heavy fire against the honved battalion enforcement arriving by the Pozsony-Nagyszombat train. There remained two possibilities: either to break out of the town and through the enemy lines or to lay down arms. Guyon, at the head of his troops, succeeded in breaking through towards Szered and Pozsony. However, the rear guard of the brigade was destroyed. It was partly comprised of the 3rd battalion of the 48th Erno Infantry Regiment which secured a loophole for escape for Guyon's troops by repeated volleys. During the following combat the battalion lost its closing-guarding unit. Four companies of the battalion, however, managed to break through, although two compass fell captive. The losses of the Hungarian army corps were 100 dead, 800 prisoners and 5 guns lost. The imperial force lost 40 people according to their own records.

The Upper Danubian Army Corps set out towards the Szepesseg in two columns. Two divisions made their way to Poprad through the steep Sturec pass and the upper valley of the Vag River, while the other two divisions headed for Iglo along the Garam and Hernad rivers. They were followed --- from a substantial distance --- by two brigades, Gotz's and Jablonowski's, the latter from the Wrbna army corps. Even so, the march was challenging especially in the first direction. It took enormous efforts for the divisions to work their way along steep, narrow, and slippery mountain paths in snow-falls with the artillery, horses, and carriages.
From the second group it was Guyon's division that arrived first after an equally strenuous trip at the appointed gathering place at Iglo on February 2. After midnight the exhausted soldiers were awakened by the tumult of war. The sound came from a detachment of General Schlik's division stationed at Locse. Schlik decided to launch a surprise night attack after hearing about Guyon's arrival at Iglo. The small detail thrust their way beside the sleeping guards into the main square and managed to seize several guns. Finally discovering them Guyon sounded the drums and his honveds, dressed in underwear, drove out the imperial troops from the town at bayonet point. To compensate for the intelligence failure and the negligent guards, Guyon also captured a few rockets in addition to reclaiming his lost guns. Using the rockets as blueprints their serial manufacture for the honved army soon began.
Having been reunited in the Szepesseg, the Upper Danubian Army Corps found its path to join Klapka near the Tisza River blocked by a detached brigade from Schlik's army corps wedged into the Branyiszko pass. This brigade hardly numbered 2,000 soldiers but the terrain facilitated their defence. The pass' steep and slippery serpentine road, narrowing among the mountains, provided excellent vantage points for the defenders. Still, Gorgei, who had appointed Guyon and his division to this task, immediately wrote up his official report about capturing the pass—only the date and the number of losses were left blank.
It turns out that Guyon deserved Gorgei's trust. On February 5 his soldiers gradually captured every barricade along the road amidst horrendous hails of bullets. The at times staggering attacks of the Szeged 33rd honved battalion and the other honved battalion comprised mostly of Slovak honveds, although still without numeration and joined Guyon in the mining area were pushed forward by Piarist army chaplain Imre Erdosi. He shouted his encouragement first in Hungarian, then in Slovakian, while all the time holding up a cross in both hands. The hussars also had their share in the battle their trumpeters got behind the last barricade, still held by the enemy, and played the attack-tune of the Hungarian rangers. The trick worked. Fearing an attack in the rear, the imperial troops surrendered their last stand.
In the wake ofthe Branyiszko victory, which claimed 350 to 400 Hungarian soldiers, the Upper Danubian Army Corps' way was opened up to unite with Klapka. The imperial losses were about the same as the Hungarians plus 100 prisoners of war.

Finally, at dawn of the 26th the troops of the main Hungarian army crossed the Danube over the new Komarom pontoon bridge while Welden's 2nd and 3rd Army Corps were congregating near Komarom. Unaware of this Gorgei's order of the 26th had counted on Simunich's besieging forces. Gorgei's dispatch said the following:
"The attack is to be executed by five brigades under Colonel Knezich's command at night from the 25th to the 26th. Kiss's and Kokenyessy's brigades of the 3rd Army Corps will cross the Danube in complete silence at midnight and line up for attack at the bridge-head, to the right of the star-shaped trench. They will be followed by Schulz's and Zako's brigades of the 1st Army Corps whose strong squads will occupy the right flank redoubts in the direction of Ujszony.
Before midnight the Dipold brigade will cross by ferries and march into the trenches toward Oszony, near the bridgehead. A part of the brigade will stand by to charge against Oszony.... The Kiss brigade will start the surprise attack from the bridge-head. At a signal they will quickly thrust toward Monostor (Sandberg) and capture it with bayonets without firing a shot. The Kokenyessy brigade will buttress Kiss and, while leaving behind strong reserves at Monostor, both units will strive 'to wind up' the enemy line.
In the meantime Schulz will forge ahead to take Ujszony. Following that all the units will move ahead as quickly as possible to reach Monostor puszta and will be supported by a strong unit of the Komarom garrison that, under Guyon's command, will start from the western tip of Dunasziget (an island in the Danube) and will board ferries to attack the enemy from the rear. Simultaneously, Dipold will advance on Oszony. We have to take all enemy entrenchment before sunrise.... In the ensuing battle—if it happens at all Klapka will command the left flank, Damjanich will command the center, and Gorgei will command the right flank. The 7th Army Corps will be the reserve."
Gorgei's instructions describe what actually happened in the first part of the battle. The eminently executed combined attack ended with the Hungarians' occupying the positions of the imperial army corps, capturing a significant number of prisoners, and some siege-guns.

It was obvious that Buda could not be captured by a rapid storming, as the military command had hoped. Preparations for a regular siege complete with siegeguns had to be made. The Komarom garrison was able to provide heavy artillery for shelling the Castle. This, however, would have entailed logistical complications and loss of time. General Guyon, who had been on bad terms with Gorgei, finally launched the barges loaded with guns only after repeatedly being ordered. Thus, the first delivery of five heavy artillery guns arrived on May 12 and began shelling the walls from the Sashegy emplacements. Up to then the siege had been limited to the "deployment" of field cannons, which did not cause any serious damage to the Castle or to its garrison, and to nighttime infantry raids which were supposed to exhaust the garrison.
The garrison's response was cruel. Although plenty had been ordered by Welden to spare Pest in case of a siege—unless an attack came Mom that direction—disregarded this order. He ordered the shelling of Pest as a response to the raids. The buildings along the Pest Danube Avenue, architectural pride of the Reform Age, were soon razed to the ground.

Meanwhile the war in the Southern Region took a turn for the worse as well. Contented with his glory at Obecse, Jellacic returned back to the other side of the Ferenc Canal. This allowed Lieutenant General Vetter, appointed as commander of the Southern Army, enough time led to reorganize the Hungarian troops. On July 12 Major-General Gyorgy Kmety and his 6,600 soldier strong division arrived in Nemesmiletics and the reinforced 20,000 strong army corps was ready to attack. Vetter's aim was to put up "demonstrative" strikes on the eastern section of the Ferenc Canal. During the distraction, on July 14, the Kmety division would cross the canal in the area of Szivacs to attack at Jellacic's troops from the flank on the 15th. Simultaneously, the 4th Army Corps, under MajorGeneral Richard Guyon's command, would perform a frontal attack on the enemy.
During this time Jellacic was also informed that in the area of Szabadka significant Hungarian forces were concentrating. Since he considered the Ferenc Canal line unsuitable for a passive defence, Jellacic was determined to strike against the Hungarian troops before they swung into action. He crossed the Ferenc Canal and at dawn on July 14 advanced on the 4th Army Corps at Kishegyes. However, the night deployment went awry. Hungarian advance guards at Feketehegy noticed them and fired on the imperial- royal troops. The Ban could not help noticing that the Hungarian line was at the flank of his troops. Yet he continued advancing but the Hungarians threw him back successively and the frontal and flank fire caused enormous havoc among the his troops.
Moreover, Guyon began a counterattack and almost threatened to block the Ban's retreat towards Verbasz. Jellacic then issued an urgent order to retreat because Kmety's division had arrived at the Kula area. If Kmety was successful in driving away the enemy garrison of Kula and advancing on to Verbasz, he could encircle the retreating imperial-royal troops. Kmety, however, was not in a hurry since, according to his orders, he was supposed to reach Kula only on the 15th and his troops had already covered a 25 km distance that day. As a result, Jellacic reached Verbasz without any serious pursuit, then he retreated to Titel, and later to Szeremseg. By July 18 his whole army was concentrated on the Titel plateau and its vicinity.
After Kishegyes the initiative was again in Hungarian hands. Jellacic considered his failure so grave that he did not dare to leave Szeremseg until mid-August. Hearing the news about the defeat of his troops Emperor Franz Joseph ordered Haynau and Fieldmarshal Nugent to extend help to the hard-pressed Ban. The Hungarian victory also proved that the Southern Region military situation could be improved without interfering with the Komarom concentration of the main force. On July 17 Vetter's headquarters was already at Petervarad and so became a starting point to plan further military operations. Vetter first considered fully relieving Petervarad because, after occupying Karloca and Szalankemen, this would facilitate starving the enemy at the Titel plateau. However' the Ministry of Defense instructed him not to experiment with the difficult task of breaking through the entrenchment in front of Petervarad but rather to make an attempt to the plateau by storm.
On July 23 Guyon launched an attack to take the plateau at several points but the defenders used the terrain's advantages to drive them back. The same day the Ministry of Defense ordered Vetter to move the 4th Army Corps to Szeged and to leave Kmety's division back to defend the Danube line and to observe the enemy in Titel. On July 25 the 4th Army Corps started on its way to Szeged. On  July 31 Minister of Defense ordered Vetter to deploy Kmety to the left side of the Tisza River. The Bacsks operations were terminated with this order on August 3.

After the arrival of Perczel's mid-Tisza army and Guyon's 4th Army Corps, a Hungarian army of 48,000 soldiers, including the units of the reserve army corps, concentrated at Szeged. An extensive but unfinished trench system defended the town and its vicinity. Between Orsova and the mouth of the Tisza River, the area was guarded by Colonel Jozsef Kollmann with about 7,000 soldiers, the left bank of the Lower Tisza River by Major-General Gyorgy Kmety with 7,000 soldiers and Colonel Lajos Bene with 5,000 soldiers. Major-General Karoly Vecsey's 9,300 soldiers camped near Temesvar while Arad was occupied by a garrison of 1,500 people. Altogether, a Hungarian force of 78,000 soldiers was stationed in the Banat.
Haynau's main army approached the main Hungarian army in three columns. The main column under his command started out on the Pest-Kecskemet-Szeged road, with the left flank under Lieutenant General Schlik advancing forward along the Cegled-Nagykoros-Tiszaalpar-Szentes-Hodmezovasarhely-Mako line. And finally, the right flank under Lieutenant General Ramberg headed towards Torokkanizsa along the Soltvadkert-Kiskunhalas-Szabadka road. Haynau's war plan was to outflank the Hungarian positions at Szeged by his left wing crossing the Maros River and by his right wing crossing the Tisza River. Thus, the Hungarians would be forced to evacuate the trenches. The attack was scheduled for August 4. This advance, however, made it possible that the Hungarian forces, which enjoyed the benefit of a central position, would attack either Schlik's or Haynau's column forcing the other columns to stop as well. But due to Meszaros' resignation on July 29, Dembinski was appointed commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army. Dembinski had no intention whatsoever of encountering Haynau. During the night of August 1 he surrendered Szeged and withdrew to the left bank of the Tisza River. Haynau had never hoped to get possession of the trenches so cheap. Because of the surrender of Szeged, Vetter resigned as a commander of the Sourthern Army.
On August 3 Haynau began crossing the river to Ujszeged. Dembinski again remained idle although by attacking on Haynau's army, he could have backed some of them into the Tisza River. However, he did nothing. On August 5 Haynau started deployment from the Ujszeged bridge-head, opposite to the Hungarian army at Szoreg. Simultaneously, Lieutenant General Georg von Ramberg' s 3rd Army Corps managed to cross the Tisza River at Torokkanizsa and now threatened the main Hungarian forces from the side. The 4th Army Corps under Guyon retreated towards Obesenyo via Oroszlanos. Then, Dembinski gave up resisting and started retreat towards Beba. On August 5, Schlik's army corps drove away the Hungarian artillery from the bank of the Maros River opposite from Mako but could not finish building the bridge before the 6th.
The Hungarian government ordered Dembinski to withdraw his troops towards Arad since Hungarian troops needed to concentrate there for a decisive battle. Incorporating Kmety's and Vecsey's troops, Dembinski set out from Szentmiklos towards Temesvar and not Arad. The retreating army met several losing rear guard encounters at Obesenyo, Kisteremia, and Csatad, and arrived at Temesvar exhausted and completely demoralized.

From the point of view of those hoping for the reinstatement of Hungary's independence, the Crimean War, erupting in 1853, appeared in the beginning to be a fortunate development. The Hungarian emigres hoped that Austria would join forces with Russia against her enemies Turkey, France, England, as well as the Sardinian Kingdom. They hoped that the war would spread to include all of Europe so that Hungary could gain its independence. Against all expectations, Austria, "the ungrateful ally," did not join the war. This, however, did not deter Hungarian emigre soldiers from willingly taking part in the war against Russia for not only did they already have a bill to settle with Russia for 1849, but they also hoped that Russia's defeat would eventually weaken Austria.
At the time of the Crimean War, dozens of former homed soldiers and officers served in the Turkish army. Among them the English Richard Guyon, Baron Maximillian Stein, and Gyorgy Kmety took part in the campaign to the very end as generals. Kmety especially stood out for his heroic defense of the fort of Kars in the face of the Russian army's superior numbers. Later, when further defense became impossible, he was still able to break Trough the enemy's forces with his remaining troops. For this accomplishment he received the highest honor a Turkish soldier could receive. Another Hungarian officer of the Crimean War was Andras Romer, later the Inspector General of the Turkish artillery at the rank of general.

Resigned imperial-royal first lieutenant;
honved general in the War of Independence;
division general of the Upper Danubian Army Corps;
commander of the Komarom fort;
commander of the 4th Army Corps. Emigrated.
Converted to Islam in Turkey. (In his biography is stated he was not converted as some others but stayed protestant)