War and society in East
Central Europe
Volume XXXV
THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
AND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE;
1848-1849
A Military History
Edited by Gabor Bona
Translated by Nora Arato
Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado
Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.
Highland Lakes, New Jersey
Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York
1999
Page 96 - 97
Starting in the fall of 1848, in addition to the main
military branches all the other necessary "military bodies" were established.
Three battalions of sappers and a bridge company were organized for engineering
duties. The Army Transportation Corps was established to fulfill the needs
of transportation and artillery traction. The honved general staff, engineer
corps, military court, quartermaster corps, military medical corps, and
military chaplaincy were also established. Military handbooks and regulations
were published to offer theoretical (strategic as well as tactical) and
practical help to the honved army and to the operation of different military
service branches. These books, with some adjustments to the Hungarian and
revolutionary situation, were translations of handbooks and regulations
used by the Imperial-Royal Army.
The composition of the army effectives was an approximate reflection
of the country. 80-85% of the soldiers were of peasant origin and primarily
from among the have-nots. City dwellers were represented by the lower classes
as well. Law students, who were mentioned above in connection with the
first ten honved battalions, were prominent in the troops formed during
the fall of 1848. They joined the artillery in large numbers and, owing
to the technical background of these former students, honved artillery
soon became well-respected even by the imperial forces. Even though factual
figures are lacking, estimates based on new recruiting quotas, the nationality
distribution of the population within country, and infor mation about established
units indicate that about 40% of the approximately 200,000 honved soldiers
belonged to non-Hungarian ethnicities. The Slovaks contributed 30,000 soldiers
while the Romanians of Hungary, together with those of Transylvania joining
during the spring of 1849, contributed about 25,000 honveds to the Hungarian
Honved Army. Germans, excluding Transylvanian Saxons, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians,
and Catholic Serbs of the Southern Region, became honveds in substantial
numbers. The Jews, whose legal exclusion in Hungary was terminated by the
laws of 1848, joined the Honvedseg in significant numbers.
The officers' corps of the honved army was also varied. Its multi-national
composition, however, rather resembled the officers' corps of the Imperial-Royal
Army. In the summer of 1849 the German Graf Karl Leiningen-Westerburg,
Lajos Aulich and Jozsef Schweidel (both Germans from Hungary), the Austrian
Ernst Poelt Ritter von Poeltenberg, an Englishman of French origin Richard
Guyon de Beaufre, the Croatian Karoly Knezic, and the Serb Janos Damjanich,
all served in the corps of generals of the honved army along with Hungarians.
In addition, there were the three Poles: Bem, Dembinski, and Wysocki.
Page 264 - 266
The new campaign started on October 28, led by Moga.
The Hungarian troops advanced as far as the Schwechat Brook. The battle
took place along that line on October 30. The Hungarian army of
27,000, divided into ten brigades, possessed 82 guns. Jellacic, on the
other side, had 23 and l/2 battalions (about 25,000 soldiers), 37 cavalry
companies (about 5,000 men), and 99 guns. Yet, the balance between the
two sides was illusory. The majority of Jellacic's army consisted of seasoned
troops with several years of experience, while half of the deployed Hungarian
troops smelled gun-powder for the first time that day. The Meszaros military
steamboat on the Danube helped to secure the Hungarian troops' flank.
On the right flank the volunteers of the English born Major Richard
Guyon advanced on and occupied the village of Mannsworth. Following
that, in the center, Gorgei's troops occupied the heights near Schwechat
and his artillery started to fire at the village of Mannsworth. Gorgei
was about to charge on the village when Moga instructed him to stop and
to wait for the left wing led by Colonel Mihaly Repasy. Repasy's brigade
united a significant part of the Hungarian cavalry which lagged behind,
and Moga was justified to think that the imperial-royal troops would thrust
into the gap created by their absence. However, as a result of Moga's command
Gorgei's troops were exposed to cannon-fire in an open area. The balls
of a twelve-pounder battery caused grave results: Gorgei's troops were
shaken and fled and the same happened to the national guardsmen and volunteers
positioned in the second line of the center. Their retreat was covered
by the artillery and the hussars.
Jellacic's plan was to get to the rear of the Hungarians, along the
bank of the Schwechat Brook, with the cavalry division led by Lieutenant
General Liechtenstein. However, Liechtenstein was late and ran into Repasy's
hussars and mounted artillery, who were also late. Thus, the Hungarian
army reached the Leuthe River without significant losses. Even Windisch-Gratz
commented on the behavior of Repasy's troops during the retreat saying:
"This is not a riffraff rebellious mob. This is an army."
During the campaign to liberate Vienna it became known that Imperial-Royal
Lieutenant General Balthasar Simunich was leading a strong brigade to invade
Trencsen county via the Jablunka pass from Moravia. On October 28
at Kosztolna, Simunich's division of 5,000 defeated Hungarian troops made
up mostly of national guardsmen led by Major Kalman Ordody. Very soon Simunich
occupied Nagyszombat and was threatening Pozsony. Ordody's troops withdrew
towards Lipotvar to prevent Simunich "to transform it into his own Szenttamas
by occupation." After the Schwechat Battle Kossuth made arrangements so
that Colonel Richard Guyon would have 8,000 men and 22 guns to be
drawn from the troops arriving in Kopcseny, to try to capture Simunich's
army. With reinforcements received in Pozsony, the force of about 10,000
men and 32 guns set out in pursuit of Simunich. According to the plans,
the National Guard of Northern Hungarian counties and Ordody's troops would
block Simunich's army and force it to lay down the arms. However, Guyon's
troops were so exhausted that they could not be dispatched without a rest.
Other Hungarian forces did not even make an attempt to block Simunich's
movements fearing his overwhelming numerical superiority. Guyon's
advance guard first reached the enemy at Nadas on November 3. The hussars
destroyed the rear-guard at Jablonic the following day, on November 4.
Unfortunately, Guyon's soldiers could not inflict any serious damage
on Simunich's quickly retreating troops. As a result, Guyon's army
returned to the eastern side of the Little Carpathians to take up position
at Nadas.
Page 290 - 291
In Transdanubia, considered to be the main theater of operations,
military operations began with the advance of General Simunich's division.
On December 14 this division made an assault on the brigade of the
Upper Danubian Army Corps, which kept the Nadas pass, and drove them out
after a short combat. This could have caused an unpleasant situation in
that Simunich's continuing advance could have placed him next to the right
flank of Gorgei's army corps gathering at Pozsony. In order to prevent
that from happening Colonel Guyon and his brigade received the order
to forge ahead towards Nagyszombat, to join Major Pal Ordody's brigade
that had been driven out of the Nadas pass, and to halt Simunich's troops.
Ordody, however, gratuitously broke off from the enemy and retreated into
the Lipotvar fort. Therefore on December 16, Guyon and his
brigade faced the enemy by themselves at Nagyszombat. During the battle
Simunich's troops partially encircled Guyon's soldiers within the
town. This became evident for the Hungarians when the imperial troops opened
heavy fire against the honved battalion enforcement arriving by the Pozsony-Nagyszombat
train. There remained two possibilities: either to break out of the town
and through the enemy lines or to lay down arms. Guyon, at the head
of his troops, succeeded in breaking through towards Szered and Pozsony.
However, the rear guard of the brigade was destroyed. It was partly comprised
of the 3rd battalion of the 48th Erno Infantry Regiment which secured a
loophole for escape for Guyon's troops by repeated volleys. During
the following combat the battalion lost its closing-guarding unit. Four
companies of the battalion, however, managed to break through, although
two compass fell captive. The losses of the Hungarian army corps were 100
dead, 800 prisoners and 5 guns lost. The imperial force lost 40 people
according to their own records.
Page 306 - 307
The Upper Danubian Army Corps set out towards the Szepesseg
in two columns. Two divisions made their way to Poprad through the steep
Sturec pass and the upper valley of the Vag River, while the other two
divisions headed for Iglo along the Garam and Hernad rivers. They were
followed --- from a substantial distance --- by two brigades, Gotz's and
Jablonowski's, the latter from the Wrbna army corps. Even so, the march
was challenging especially in the first direction. It took enormous efforts
for the divisions to work their way along steep, narrow, and slippery mountain
paths in snow-falls with the artillery, horses, and carriages.
From the second group it was Guyon's division that arrived first
after an equally strenuous trip at the appointed gathering place at Iglo
on February 2. After midnight the exhausted soldiers were awakened
by the tumult of war. The sound came from a detachment of General Schlik's
division stationed at Locse. Schlik decided to launch a surprise night
attack after hearing about Guyon's arrival at Iglo. The small detail
thrust their way beside the sleeping guards into the main square and managed
to seize several guns. Finally discovering them Guyon sounded the
drums and his honveds, dressed in underwear, drove out the imperial troops
from the town at bayonet point. To compensate for the intelligence failure
and the negligent guards, Guyon also captured a few rockets in addition
to reclaiming his lost guns. Using the rockets as blueprints their serial
manufacture for the honved army soon began.
Having been reunited in the Szepesseg, the Upper Danubian Army Corps
found its path to join Klapka near the Tisza River blocked by a detached
brigade from Schlik's army corps wedged into the Branyiszko pass. This
brigade hardly numbered 2,000 soldiers but the terrain facilitated their
defence. The pass' steep and slippery serpentine road, narrowing among
the mountains, provided excellent vantage points for the defenders. Still,
Gorgei, who had appointed Guyon and his division to this task, immediately
wrote up his official report about capturing the pass—only the date and
the number of losses were left blank.
It turns out that Guyon deserved Gorgei's trust. On February
5 his soldiers gradually captured every barricade along the road amidst
horrendous hails of bullets. The at times staggering attacks of the Szeged
33rd honved battalion and the other honved battalion comprised mostly of
Slovak honveds, although still without numeration and joined Guyon
in the mining area were pushed forward by Piarist army chaplain Imre Erdosi.
He shouted his encouragement first in Hungarian, then in Slovakian, while
all the time holding up a cross in both hands. The hussars also had their
share in the battle their trumpeters got behind the last barricade, still
held by the enemy, and played the attack-tune of the Hungarian rangers.
The trick worked. Fearing an attack in the rear, the imperial troops surrendered
their last stand.
In the wake ofthe Branyiszko victory, which claimed 350 to 400 Hungarian
soldiers, the Upper Danubian Army Corps' way was opened up to unite with
Klapka. The imperial losses were about the same as the Hungarians plus
100 prisoners of war.
Page 354 - 355
Finally, at dawn of the 26th the troops of the main
Hungarian army crossed the Danube over the new Komarom pontoon bridge while
Welden's 2nd and 3rd Army Corps were congregating near Komarom. Unaware
of this Gorgei's order of the 26th had counted on Simunich's besieging
forces. Gorgei's dispatch said the following:
"The attack is to be executed by five brigades under Colonel Knezich's
command at night from the 25th to the 26th. Kiss's and Kokenyessy's brigades
of the 3rd Army Corps will cross the Danube in complete silence at midnight
and line up for attack at the bridge-head, to the right of the star-shaped
trench. They will be followed by Schulz's and Zako's brigades of the 1st
Army Corps whose strong squads will occupy the right flank redoubts in
the direction of Ujszony.
Before midnight the Dipold brigade will cross by ferries and march
into the trenches toward Oszony, near the bridgehead. A part of the brigade
will stand by to charge against Oszony.... The Kiss brigade will start
the surprise attack from the bridge-head. At a signal they will quickly
thrust toward Monostor (Sandberg) and capture it with bayonets without
firing a shot. The Kokenyessy brigade will buttress Kiss and, while leaving
behind strong reserves at Monostor, both units will strive 'to wind up'
the enemy line.
In the meantime Schulz will forge ahead to take Ujszony. Following
that all the units will move ahead as quickly as possible to reach Monostor
puszta and will be supported by a strong unit of the Komarom garrison that,
under Guyon's command, will start from the western tip of Dunasziget
(an island in the Danube) and will board ferries to attack the enemy from
the rear. Simultaneously, Dipold will advance on Oszony. We have to take
all enemy entrenchment before sunrise.... In the ensuing battle—if it happens
at all Klapka will command the left flank, Damjanich will command the center,
and Gorgei will command the right flank. The 7th Army Corps will be the
reserve."
Gorgei's instructions describe what actually happened in the first
part of the battle. The eminently executed combined attack ended with the
Hungarians' occupying the positions of the imperial army corps, capturing
a significant number of prisoners, and some siege-guns.
Page 360
It was obvious that Buda could not be captured by a rapid storming,
as the military command had hoped. Preparations for a regular siege complete
with siegeguns had to be made. The Komarom garrison was able to provide
heavy artillery for shelling the Castle. This, however, would have entailed
logistical complications and loss of time. General Guyon, who had
been on bad terms with Gorgei, finally launched the barges loaded with
guns only after repeatedly being ordered. Thus, the first delivery of five
heavy artillery guns arrived on May 12 and began shelling the walls
from the Sashegy emplacements. Up to then the siege had been limited to
the "deployment" of field cannons, which did not cause any serious damage
to the Castle or to its garrison, and to nighttime infantry raids which
were supposed to exhaust the garrison.
The garrison's response was cruel. Although plenty had been ordered
by Welden to spare Pest in case of a siege—unless an attack came Mom that
direction—disregarded this order. He ordered the shelling of Pest as a
response to the raids. The buildings along the Pest Danube Avenue, architectural
pride of the Reform Age, were soon razed to the ground.
Page 406 - 408
Meanwhile the war in the Southern Region took a turn for the
worse as well. Contented with his glory at Obecse, Jellacic returned back
to the other side of the Ferenc Canal. This allowed Lieutenant General
Vetter, appointed as commander of the Southern Army, enough time led to
reorganize the Hungarian troops. On July 12 Major-General Gyorgy
Kmety and his 6,600 soldier strong division arrived in Nemesmiletics and
the reinforced 20,000 strong army corps was ready to attack. Vetter's aim
was to put up "demonstrative" strikes on the eastern section of the Ferenc
Canal. During the distraction, on July 14, the Kmety division would
cross the canal in the area of Szivacs to attack at Jellacic's troops from
the flank on the 15th. Simultaneously, the 4th Army Corps, under
MajorGeneral Richard Guyon's command, would perform a frontal attack
on the enemy.
During this time Jellacic was also informed that in the area of Szabadka
significant Hungarian forces were concentrating. Since he considered the
Ferenc Canal line unsuitable for a passive defence, Jellacic was determined
to strike against the Hungarian troops before they swung into action. He
crossed the Ferenc Canal and at dawn on July 14 advanced on the
4th Army Corps at Kishegyes. However, the night deployment went awry. Hungarian
advance guards at Feketehegy noticed them and fired on the imperial- royal
troops. The Ban could not help noticing that the Hungarian line was at
the flank of his troops. Yet he continued advancing but the Hungarians
threw him back successively and the frontal and flank fire caused enormous
havoc among the his troops.
Moreover, Guyon began a counterattack and almost threatened
to block the Ban's retreat towards Verbasz. Jellacic then issued an urgent
order to retreat because Kmety's division had arrived at the Kula area.
If Kmety was successful in driving away the enemy garrison of Kula and
advancing on to Verbasz, he could encircle the retreating imperial-royal
troops. Kmety, however, was not in a hurry since, according to his orders,
he was supposed to reach Kula only on the 15th and his troops had already
covered a 25 km distance that day. As a result, Jellacic reached Verbasz
without any serious pursuit, then he retreated to Titel, and later to Szeremseg.
By July 18 his whole army was concentrated on the Titel plateau and its
vicinity.
After Kishegyes the initiative was again in Hungarian hands. Jellacic
considered his failure so grave that he did not dare to leave Szeremseg
until mid-August. Hearing the news about the defeat of his troops Emperor
Franz Joseph ordered Haynau and Fieldmarshal Nugent to extend help to the
hard-pressed Ban. The Hungarian victory also proved that the Southern Region
military situation could be improved without interfering with the Komarom
concentration of the main force. On July 17 Vetter's headquarters was already
at Petervarad and so became a starting point to plan further military operations.
Vetter first considered fully relieving Petervarad because, after occupying
Karloca and Szalankemen, this would facilitate starving the enemy at the
Titel plateau. However' the Ministry of Defense instructed him not to experiment
with the difficult task of breaking through the entrenchment in front of
Petervarad but rather to make an attempt to the plateau by storm.
On July 23 Guyon launched an attack to take the plateau at several
points but the defenders used the terrain's advantages to drive them back.
The same day the Ministry of Defense ordered Vetter to move the 4th Army
Corps to Szeged and to leave Kmety's division back to defend the Danube
line and to observe the enemy in Titel. On July 25 the 4th Army
Corps started on its way to Szeged. On July 31 Minister of
Defense ordered Vetter to deploy Kmety to the left side of the Tisza River.
The Bacsks operations were terminated with this order on August 3.
Page 412 - 413
After the arrival of Perczel's mid-Tisza army and Guyon's
4th Army Corps, a Hungarian army of 48,000 soldiers, including the units
of the reserve army corps, concentrated at Szeged. An extensive but unfinished
trench system defended the town and its vicinity. Between Orsova and the
mouth of the Tisza River, the area was guarded by Colonel Jozsef Kollmann
with about 7,000 soldiers, the left bank of the Lower Tisza River by Major-General
Gyorgy Kmety with 7,000 soldiers and Colonel Lajos Bene with 5,000 soldiers.
Major-General Karoly Vecsey's 9,300 soldiers camped near Temesvar while
Arad was occupied by a garrison of 1,500 people. Altogether, a Hungarian
force of 78,000 soldiers was stationed in the Banat.
Haynau's main army approached the main Hungarian army in three columns.
The main column under his command started out on the Pest-Kecskemet-Szeged
road, with the left flank under Lieutenant General Schlik advancing forward
along the Cegled-Nagykoros-Tiszaalpar-Szentes-Hodmezovasarhely-Mako line.
And finally, the right flank under Lieutenant General Ramberg headed towards
Torokkanizsa along the Soltvadkert-Kiskunhalas-Szabadka road. Haynau's
war plan was to outflank the Hungarian positions at Szeged by his left
wing crossing the Maros River and by his right wing crossing the Tisza
River. Thus, the Hungarians would be forced to evacuate the trenches. The
attack was scheduled for August 4. This advance, however, made it
possible that the Hungarian forces, which enjoyed the benefit of a central
position, would attack either Schlik's or Haynau's column forcing the other
columns to stop as well. But due to Meszaros' resignation on July 29,
Dembinski was appointed commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army. Dembinski
had no intention whatsoever of encountering Haynau. During the night of
August 1 he surrendered Szeged and withdrew to the left bank of the Tisza
River. Haynau had never hoped to get possession of the trenches so cheap.
Because of the surrender of Szeged, Vetter resigned as a commander of the
Sourthern Army.
On August 3 Haynau began crossing the river to Ujszeged. Dembinski
again remained idle although by attacking on Haynau's army, he could have
backed some of them into the Tisza River. However, he did nothing. On August
5 Haynau started deployment from the Ujszeged bridge-head, opposite to
the Hungarian army at Szoreg. Simultaneously, Lieutenant General Georg
von Ramberg' s 3rd Army Corps managed to cross the Tisza River at Torokkanizsa
and now threatened the main Hungarian forces from the side. The 4th Army
Corps under Guyon retreated towards Obesenyo via Oroszlanos. Then,
Dembinski gave up resisting and started retreat towards Beba. On August
5, Schlik's army corps drove away the Hungarian artillery from the
bank of the Maros River opposite from Mako but could not finish building
the bridge before the 6th.
The Hungarian government ordered Dembinski to withdraw his troops towards
Arad since Hungarian troops needed to concentrate there for a decisive
battle. Incorporating Kmety's and Vecsey's troops, Dembinski set out from
Szentmiklos towards Temesvar and not Arad. The retreating army met several
losing rear guard encounters at Obesenyo, Kisteremia, and Csatad, and arrived
at Temesvar exhausted and completely demoralized.
Page 445 - 446
From the point of view of those hoping for the reinstatement
of Hungary's independence, the Crimean War, erupting in 1853, appeared
in the beginning to be a fortunate development. The Hungarian emigres hoped
that Austria would join forces with Russia against her enemies Turkey,
France, England, as well as the Sardinian Kingdom. They hoped that the
war would spread to include all of Europe so that Hungary could gain its
independence. Against all expectations, Austria, "the ungrateful ally,"
did not join the war. This, however, did not deter Hungarian emigre soldiers
from willingly taking part in the war against Russia for not only did they
already have a bill to settle with Russia for 1849, but they also hoped
that Russia's defeat would eventually weaken Austria.
At the time of the Crimean War, dozens of former homed soldiers and
officers served in the Turkish army. Among them the English Richard Guyon,
Baron Maximillian Stein, and Gyorgy Kmety took part in the campaign to
the very end as generals. Kmety especially stood out for his heroic defense
of the fort of Kars in the face of the Russian army's superior numbers.
Later, when further defense became impossible, he was still able to break
Trough the enemy's forces with his remaining troops. For this accomplishment
he received the highest honor a Turkish soldier could receive. Another
Hungarian officer of the Crimean War was Andras Romer, later the Inspector
General of the Turkish artillery at the rank of general.
Page 501 - Biograpies of Key Personalities
Guyon de Beaufre, Richard (1813-1856)
Resigned imperial-royal first lieutenant;
honved general in the War of Independence;
division general of the Upper Danubian Army Corps;
commander of the Komarom fort;
commander of the 4th Army Corps. Emigrated.
Converted to Islam in Turkey. (In his biography is
stated he was not converted as some others but stayed protestant)
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