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Biography of General Richard Guyon

General Richard Guyon

for the period 1838 - 1855

                                                            Museum of War Budapest

 

Letter to Gen. John Slade by the writer
Family and early life
The Hungarian war for freedom
Between the wars
Asiatic Campaign
Conclusion

Publications concerning the Hungarian war for freedom
Publications concerning the Asiatic Campaign
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The Hungarian war for freedom
The crimean war

  Biography of General Richard Guyon
 

ASIATIC CAMPAIGN.

In November, 1853, he was again directed to proceed from Damascus, with all dispatch, to the army of Anatolia; and after a most fatiguing journey, accomplished in an incredibly short time, on relays of horses, without rest, and knocking up several of the couriers who only accompanied him from stage to stage, he reached Kars, shortly after the Turkish forces had sustained a defeat at Soobaltan. The European newspapers of the day gave out the rumour of his having been killed in that action, but it turned out that he had not been able to join in time; or a battle, lost through the mere incapacity of a leader, might have borne a different aspect. He had been appointed by the Porte as chief of the staff, and president of the military counsel, a very equivocal position, accounted for, however, on the ground that there is always an unwillingness on the part of the Turkish government to permit a Christian to hold any direct military command over its forces. The state of the army in Anatolia was considered at Constantinople tot be very disorganised, and General Guyon was furnished with full authority on this occasion to remodel the same. 
With his usual energy, he adopted immediate measures for its improvement. He found it a merely halfarmed half-mutinous, rabble. He saw that the men were totally neglected by their chief; and in want of almost every necessary; nor could all his endeavour and representations obtain for them the necessary supplies of arms and ammunition, clothing, shoes, or medical stores. 
He proceeded, however, to correct, as far as in him lay, the abuses of the contractors for food to the troops, in the peculation of which the leaders had largely participated; and he distributed the contents of the military chest to pay the soldiers. The Pachas had been reserving this ample backsheesh (28) for themselves, leaving the troops twelve and eighteen months in arrear, while few of themselves were two months behind, and the greater part had received theirs to the day. These and many other straightforward measures caused the soldiery to have the greatest faith in him. The army was thus far re-organized. Many of the Bashi-Bazouks who had fled, returned, and rejoined their old standards. He formed outposts in the neighbourhood of the camp; a measure of safety, which hitherto had been neglected, even when in the vicinity of an enemy. Drills, manoeuvres, field-days, and exercises were established, and at last, such efficient hospital accommodation were arranged, as the slender means at his disposal permitted; but there were innumerable demands upon his time, his temper, and his ingenuity. 
Thus he found at Kars no less than 15,000 soldiers, under 21 pashas, each of whom had the rank and pay of a general. To detail their squabbles, petty jealousies, and the unremitting industry with which each was endeavouring to undermine and supplant the others, would weary and disgust the reader. In one thing only they were consistent, namely, in villifying the conduct of General Guyon, and in raising every possible obstacle in his way. It was soon made manifest, however, that the heart of the Turkish soldier could be easily reached and touched. The experience which General Guyon had long before acquired of the effect of moral force over masses of men, was made manifest enough, by the mastery he so soon acquired over their feelings. " A few kind words, a display of interest in his welfare, and honesty of purpose, suffice (says Mr. Duncan, in his last admirable work) to gain the poor Turk's heart for ever." This the pashas and their general saw; and here the jealousy of a few unworthy Polish officers came to their aid, and hourly retarded every step towards amendment, and a better organization, which Guyon so unhesitatingly undertook. 
Food was now sold in Kars at famine prices, servants were scarce, expenses were trebling, and supplies were scarce, every means of comfort were lacking, and subsistence itself was becoming an important question. Around Kars, the whole country was in a state of disturbance and alarm. 
" The cold had been terrible, means of comfort were scanty, the contiguous provinces were disturbed, and as the spring drew near, a thaw reduced the streets within, and the plains without, to an indescribable state of mud and misery; as a natural result the Pashas diminished instead of increasing their exertions, and pushed forward with more malignant zeal their intrigues against General Guyon. (29)
Added to all, Kars was almost undefended by fortifications. The poverty of the exchequer, and the general neglect of the ruling officials, from the lowest to the highest, had permitted gaps to become breaches, while the breaches again widened into the lengths of whole walls, whose value was now begun to be felt. Commanded as the city was by a ridge of hills, the largest being known as the Kara- dagh, or the Black mountain, the construction of one species of defence became a pressing necessity. There were no engineers, no sappers, and but a few tools "The Mucher General Guyon, and the pashas, made a reconnaissance, one morning as far as Kara-dagh, and, pipe in mouth, gravely surveyed the position. After much dispute, it was decided that Guyon should construct the redoubts that were lacking, and which were to crown the Black Mountain. (30)
Despite the difficulties, almost insuperable, offered, by five feet of snow, the volcanic convulsion of the mountain, the lack of mechanical and engineering instruments, and proper materials, he determined to erect eight of these defences, to be mounted by 46 cannon. Men were non wanting, and it began to be found that sickness and famine had debilitated the army to a third of its proper strength. The notice given by the Muchir to the inhabitants, that they were to assist with hand and purse, in the construction of the earth works and fortifications, caused almost a panic. Slowly, and by fits and starts, the works proceeded, but that so tardily, that a more sanguine man than Guyon might have been pardoned, if in disgust and despair he had surrendered the task. But the General's indomitable perseverance at last prevailed over the countless obstacles, and the redoubts began to exhibit form and force, the ultimate good effects of which tended to perfect the recent splendid defence of Kars, where the Turks, commanded by General Williams, the brave Hungarian hero Kmety, Colonel Lake, and other European officers, performed a feat of arms, which for skill, heroism, and devotion, may be deemed one of the most glorious achievements of this war. 
The popularity of General Guyon among the troops is shewn by the following circumstance. In January, 1854, the far-famed Iskender Bey (31) arrived at Constantinople, the bearer of a petition addressed to the Sultan, signed by all the officers of the army of Anatolia, praying that the chief command might be conferred upon General Guyon. Such a manifestation did not fail to draw upon him the hatred and jealousy of the senior pashas, and led to a system of persevering opposition. " A miserable cabal," says a Times leader, Sept. 23, 1854, " among the Poles and the pashas, has been got up to oppose the advice, and traduce the conduct of General Guyon, the only man of courage and judgment on the spot." The Poles and pashas had obtained the ear of the Muchir (Commander- in-chief), Zariff Mustapha Pasha, and they seemed bent upon allowing nothing to be done which originated with those who held the post and offices they had arranged and fixed upon as their own. In addition, every attempt made on the part of Guyon, or the Hungarian officers attached to him (and who knew him so well), to obtain a forward movement of the Turkish forces against the Russians, met with a decided negative. The Turks were numerically superior to the Russians, hut the nervous and self-opiniated old Muschir permitted every opportunity of striking a blow to slip by, however promising, and even tempting, allowing the enemy, far more active and alert, to improve every neglect, to arrange their own plans, to take and complete their own measures. 
On the 9th of June, however, a spirited affair occurred at the outposts, and Ismael Pasha, with the brave old Hungarian General Kmety, repulsed the attack of a strong body of Russians on Technitz. The idea prevailed at Kars, that this advance of the enemy from Gumri across the Arpachai (32) River, was but a feint to cover a more serious movement against Ardahan, by Akhaltzik. General Guyon succeeded so far as to procure the advance of some infantry, and a battery of guns, under the command of Kerim Pasha, in order to support the garrison. As the men defiled out of Kars, they shouted out " Kourschid Pasha istersiz !" (we want General Guyon); and from the outposts a request was sent in by the soldiers, that Guyon should go and take the immediate command, and lead them against the Russians. This Expedition, proposed, however, on mature consideration, over a close counsel by the Muschir and his conclave, was recalled before. they had proceeded far. 
Ferad Pasha (the German Colonel Baron Stein), who had reconnoitered Erivan, then held by a small body of Russians, offered, when the proposed attack on Akhaltzik was abandoned, to carry off the garrison of Erivan, with the aid of only a handful of light troops. 
The following narrow escape sustained by General Guyon, while it illustrates the constant dangers to which he was daily exposed, exhibits also, and in a form by no means creditable, the little die he could place in circumstances of personal peril upon those of his officers especially whose duty it was to have rallied, and even to have perished on the field, rather than to have deserted him at so critical a moment, and in so shameless a way. 
" On the 25th of July (says Mr. Duncan, in his animated and instructive Travels), General Guyon and General Brainski narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Cossacks, and only avoided the calamity through the superior speed of their Arab horses. These officers incurred a far greater risk than even that encountered by Sir George Brown, who, on the landing of the Crimean expedition, narrowly escaped falling a prey to the vigilant and active Cossacks. Had fortune favoured the Russians on this occasion, the capture of these two generals would have been almost equivalent to a victory. The generals, with their aides-de-camp, escorted by a squadron of cavalry, had proceeded on a reconnaissance towards the village of Percher, where, for a short time, it was projected to remove the encampment of Hadgi-Velikoi. The Muchir had previously given them to understand that the village was occupied by the irregulars under Hassan Yassegi, and therefore, anticipating no danger and wishing to avoid recognition, the generals left their escort behind them, and proceeded to the right of Perghet, in the direction of the Russian camp. Later it was ascertained that the Muchir's order had not been at once obeyed by the commander of the Bashi-bazooks, and that the village was in possession of the Cossacks. 
" The generals had not proceeded far, when, on descending a slight hill, they found themselves in the midst of a party of Cossacks, who had been lying in wait for them. 
Captain de Cellis, my tall friend the dragoon, was riding leisurely in advance, when he found himself in a nest of these dismounted irregulars; he immediately wheeled round and gave timely warning to the two generals. To turn their horses and gallop towards the escort was the work of an instant. On approaching the village, another body of Cossacks cut off their road and gave hot pursuit; and at this moment, the lances of the Cossacks were but a few yards distant from the unlucky generals. The latter then turned their horses in the direction of the mountain which screened the Ottoman camp, and on which a military post was stationed. The Cossacks had been reinforced, and divining their intentions, likewise intercepted this road of retreat. In the meantime, two squadrons of Cossacks appeared at a distance, and the Turkish escort, which the generals had left behind them, at this vision turned and fled, the officers setting the example. 
"No hope but in the speed of their horses now remained to the generals, and putting these to their utmost mettle, they dashed on over ravines and hills, closely followed by the stubborn Cossacks. 
" During the long pursuit, General Guyon had often lost patience, and was with difficulty restrained from attempting to drive back the foe at the point of the sabre; but the cooler head of General Brainski pointed out the hopeless nature of that measure, which would inevitably have failed against the numerical superiority of the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to mention that in any European service, the commanding officers of the escorting, squadron which so basely deserted its charge, would have been shot or degraded; but in this instance nothing of the kind was done. It was proposed by the Muchir to have the officers flogged—the customary Turkish punishment for all of fences—but the generals very properly declined to countenanec that act." 
Matters continued in an unsatisfactory state throughout the summer, until, on the 29th July, 1854, when the Russians attacked and routed the Turkish division at Bayazid, Selim Pasha, contrary to his orders (it is stated), having accepted the challenge of battle, had been entirely defeated, and was retreating to Van, the Russian main body, 8000 strong, being in full pursuit after him, while a corps of 1000 cavalry and 2000 infantry occupied the road leading from Bayazid to Erzeroum, which, with its small garrison of 800 Redifs, lay entirely at the mercy of the enemy. Spies apprised the Turkish commander-in-chief of this, adding that a combined attack was meditated. The arrangement was that General Prince Bebutoff was to attack the Turkish front so soon as the victorious corps of Bayazid, having blockaded the Turks in the fortress of Van, should, by forced marches by the Erzeroum road, have reached the rear. (33)
This rendered the situation of the Turkish army extremely critical, and only two methods of resistance offered themselves, either to fall back upon Kars, and from thence send a division against the enemy in the rear, or fall with the whole weight of their forces on General Prince Bebutoff's army in front, and beat him before he should have had time to combine his movements. The second, presenting greater probabilities of success (the first involving also the disgraceful aspect of a retreat), was determined upon, and the result was that on the 16th of August the obstinate battle of Kurekdere was fought, in which General Guyon was conspicuous by his daring efforts. 
The importance of retrieving the loss incurred by the defeat of Bayazid was most imminent, because Bayazid being situated on the water-shed which separates the sources of the Euphrates from those of the Araxes, the vast commerce carried on with central Asia by the port of Trebizond would be seriously endangered. (34) The exports of Great Britain to Trebizond alone are valued at a million sterling annually, and we ourselves have an especial interest in securing these Trans-Caucasian routes from all Russian interference and encroachment. 
The Turkish army on the whole fought well, and on this occasion exhibited at least its great capability of endurance in the field. The army of Asia had hitherto few advantages of organisation and familiarity with campaigns, except in a desultory warfare, peculiar to the people themselves. 
We have already seen what the exertions of General Guyon performed in respect to the former, while practice in the latter was likely to initiate the soldiers in whatever they had hitherto been deficient. General Guyon (according to the Times), who fortunately came to Kars and Erzeroum, probably saved the army from dissolution, for he brought with him his English character, his Austrian military education, and some experience of Eastern troops, three consummate qualities that, unfettered and untrammelled, might soon have been productive of success in every department. Even the great and vindictive opposition he met with on every hand, and on every occasion, could not altogether counteract what his determined mind had set itself about. 
The battle of Kurekdere was Indecisive in its immediate results, though important future advantages were involved, even in the defeat of the Turks; for, attacking the Russians, who were strongly entrenched, they bravely bore the brunt of a most sanguinary contest, and it is not difficult to see that the defeat was less owing to their own pluck and steadiness, than to the utter incompetence of the Muchir, the poltroonery of his leading officers, and the jealousy of the wrangling adventurers, principally Poles, who, enraged at the superiority of General Guyon,  lost no opportunity of casting obloquy upon his reputation; and with an unscrupulous audacity, which has given to them a reputation as lasting as it is infamous, scrupled not, in spite of well-known facts, and the necessities of their condition, in perilling the safety of the whole arm, by their malignant and senseless spite. 

" General Guyon," writes the correspondent of the Daily News, May, 1854, " is literally adored by the troops, and well merits their devotion. A more perfect specimen of a soldier cannot be imagined, and England may be proud of this her son. In person, Guyon is of the middle height, strong but gracefully formed. His features are finely chiselled, and set off by a nut-brown beard; but; what strikes universal attention, as it did mine, is the immense power concentrated in his blue eyes. I had never before seen eyes so brilliant, and so piercingly searching. They read through a man's heart and soul. Tile personal activity of General Guyon is astounding, and proves his frame to be made of steel. He rises at six, works hard until eleven or twelve, and then sets out on horseback, either to visit the fortification works, or to review the troops. He thus remains mounted some six or seven hours, which, in the present season of the year, with its aching cold, -is no small feat. Then he returns to work, sees everybody and everything; all business passes through his hands, and most of the plans now in operation are the children of his brain. Snatching time for a hasty meal, the General resumes his hard labours until two in the morning, when he retires to bed only to get up again at six. This activity is catching, and even the sluggish native officers have not escaped the infection. At this moment the position here is so critical, and matters so perfectly hopeless, that to be silent would be criminal. . ......................... 
General Guyon and his two generals are indefatigable in their exertions to keep up the spirits of the army, and their European military experience leads them to indulge in sanguine hopes of assistance from Constantinople, in which I do not concur. As for Guyon, I feel assured that, were he ordered to take Ehrenbreitstein with a corporal and six men, he would not despair; of success." 
" The personal appearance of General Guyon," says Mr. Duncan,"as it first struck me, was prepossessing.  His short but muscular frame betrayed great strength and activity. His face expressed resolution and courage, and was soldier-like, without bearing the aspect of semi-ferocity, which our historical painters delight to bestow on the lineaments of their martial heroes. A clear sunburnt complexion, lighted up by piercing blue eyes, and encircled by a curling chesnut-coloured beard, presented a strange contrast to the dark melancholic features of the Ottoman commanders who surrounded him. General Guyon was in the prime of manhood, being 42 years of age; but premature wrinkles, drawn strongly across the forehead, bore witness to a past existence of fatigue and anxiety. A fine swordsman, a splendid and graceful rider, Guyon was intended by nature for a cavalry general; and if his talents as a commander are contested, none can deny his generous qualities or his brilliant courage. Guyon appeared insensible to fatigue. His habits at Kars astonished the calm indolent Turkish pashas, and not a little annoyed the officers immediately connected with him, who were totally unaccustomed to such activity. He rose at daybreak—mounted with his aides-de-camps, and either visited the fortifications that were being constructed around the town, or inspected the troops. At nine he breakfasted, to which meal the small Anglo-Saxon colony with the army had standing invitations. At 11, Guyon again commenced his inspections, and his whole day thus passed on horseback. At sunset, he dined with the Muchir Zarif Mustapha Pasha,- and then plans were daily formed that were never doomed to be realised. These meals were generally commenced with compliments, and concluded in violent recriminations. The evening was passed by Guyon at his quarters, in addressing communications or remonstrances to the Seraskier at Constantinople, on the deplorable condition of the army, that were destined to be totally unheeded. Later in the evening, his most familiar friends took their coffee or pipes with him, and talked over past times, or their distant homes. The early hours of the morning Guyon passed in dictating letters and plans to his military secretary, Major Bonfanti; and never till one or two o'clock did he retire to rest, and then only to enjoy a few hours' repose. The influence possessed in the councils of the Turkish commanders ceased to exist shortly after the arrival at Kars of the Polish pashas, on whose conduct I have commented below. The native officers of rank, who viewed the presence of all foreigners with undisguised aversion, profited by the intriguing disposition evinced by the Poles to undermine the reputation of Guyon with the military authorities at Constantinople. They aimed at obtaining the removal of Guyon from his position as head of the staff, not, as was fondly imagined by the Poles, to nominate a successor from their ranks, but in order to absolve themselves entirely from foreign influence. In the eyes of the Turkish pashas, Hungarians, Poles, Frenchmen, or Englishmen, were alike distasteful; and if they profited by the intriguing disposition of the Polish officers present with the army, it was not from the slightest- personal sympathy with them or with their cause. Against these intrigues Guyon could offer but a faint resistance. His open passionate temperament did not permit him to employ the same disgraceful means as: his enemies, and her, consequently, found himself exposed to continual slights on the part of the Turkish pashas.  With the troops Guyon vas eminently popular. His affable manner and deepfelt sympathy with their sufferings, rendered him an object of affection to them, and loud were their praises in behalf of the Magyar Pasha, as they called him." 
Having so far dwelt on the personal characteristics of this brilliant commander, whose great career has for a time been checked by unworthy foreign influences, and to the indifference manifested for his fate by the English nation, we will proceed to the scene of events, which proved so disastrous to the Asiatic Army. 
The description of the battle of Kurekdere has been given with so much pictorial effect and power by the Times' correspondent, that we make no apology for presenting it to our readers in extenso; and to those of our military readers who may be desirous of perusing a more detailed account of the respective forces and operations of the rival armies, we must again refer them to Mr.  Duncan's History of the War in Asia. 

"KARS.  Aug. 7
" I have at length to report a great battle and a shameful defeat. 
" My last letter, containing only an account of some recent skirmishes and fresh illustrations of Zarif Pasha's utter unfitness for the post which he here fills, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, was more than half written, when an advance of the Russians towards our camp set everybody in motion, and myself among the rest. This was on Friday last. On came the hostile battalions in formidable and imposing, order across the plain which separates the two camps, their artillery, infantry, and cavalry being clearly distinguishable as they rapidly advanced. On reaching the mid distance between their own and the Turkish outposts, they halted, in seeming expectation that their apparent offer of battle would be accepted by the Muchir; but, this being declined, after an hour or two's delay they slowly returned to their own tents, and we in the Turkish camp added another to our already numerous " imprecations loud and deep" at this seemingly fresh instance of Zarif Pasha's cowardice. The interruption, short as it had been, had put it out of my power to finish my halfwritten dispatch, and forward it in time for Monday morning's post from Erzeroum; and I, accordingly, breathed a supplemental " blessing" on the author of our disappointment. At that time, however, I  knew not the special cause of the Turkish general's refusal to accept the proffered challenge; but a few hours later I and the rest of " the many," learnt that this time it had a justifying reason, and was to be followed forthwith by action on his own part. 
" For the sake of completeness in my narrative of what followed, it is necessary to mention, that on the 3rd inst. an aide-de-camp arrived from Bayazid with the double intelligence of the defeat of 8000 Turks under Selim Pasha (do not confound him with the commander of the same name on the coast of Circassia), by a superior force of 11,000 Russians, and of the advance of a body of the enemy 8000 strong upon Erzeroum. With reference to the former piece of news, I may mention that this defeat, which cost the Turks 1800 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, resulted directly from the disobedience of the commander to certain explicit orders sent from this by Khourschid Pasha (Guyon). The latter general had directed Selim Pasha to stand entirely on the defensive till the occurrence of a specified and expected movement of the enemy; but "wise in his own conceit," the Turk—like many others of his fellows—set at nought Guyon's instructions, attacked the Russians, and suffered the predicted consequence of a defeat. But this news was of less moment than the reported advance upon Erzeroum, which was soon confirmed by the arrival of spies and scouts, who affirmed that the hostile division had already reached Toprak-kale, and—what was of greatest importance of all—was a portion of Bebutoff's army (our neighbours at Hadjivelekioi), which was intended to attack us in the rear, while Bebutoff himself fell upon us in front with the remainder of his force. Here was startling news for Zarif Pasha and his fellow imbeciles. Their flurry and alarm were amusing to witness. What was to be done ? The Muchir himself, unable to conceive a step in any direction, called together his Turkish generals and besought counsel; but their suggestive faculties were little clearer or more lively than his own. Pasha 'This' proposed one thing, which Pasha ' That ' I declared to be suicide, and advised something else, which in its turn was overruled by Pasha ' The Other,' who denounced both plans as certain to end in defeat, and yet was unable to suggest a third. Oxthodox advisers, therefore, failing to get him out of his difficulty, the Muchir at last was driven to the unwelcome necessity of falling back upon his dernier resort—Guyon. This general had already seen at a glance the only course suggested by the circumstances, and consequently counselled an immediate attack upon the now weakened force of Bebutoff; and then, after its defeat, a similar course in reference to the column which was behind towards Erzeroum. Taken thus in turn, there could be no reasonable doubt as to the destruction of both. This was on the evening of the 3rd. Guyon's plan was to make a night march that same night, and attack the Russians at the dawn of the 4th. The nervous Commander-in-Chief, with a faint heart and sinking pulse, agreed to the proposal, but declared that its execution must be put off till the 6th, as the 4th and 5th were unlucky days in the Turkish calendar, being in the sign of the Ram or Crab, or some equally fatal and not to be thought of conjunction. It was in vain that General Guyon endeavoured to override this superstitious objection. Zarif Pasha had made a wonderful concession in consenting to a fight at all; but the Ram and Crab were considerations not to be yielded to any amount of argument or persuasion Khoursehid Pasha (Guyon) could call to his aid, anti so the attack upon the Russians was finally fixed for the dawn of Sunday, the 6th. On Friday, as already mentioned, the enemy appeared in the plain, but, for the reason now specified, were allowed to exhibit themselves to no purpose. 
"Accordingly, on the evening of the 5th it became known in the camp that the Muchir had at length 'screwed his courage to the sticking place,' and that sunrise on the following morning would witness a trial of strength between the two armies.  He himself rode through the camp personally to communicate his intention and encourage the men, who heard the news gladly. Ammunition was distributed, on the backs of mules, from the magazine to the various regiments; arms were individually 'looked to,' and little groups were assembled at all points in eager and seemingly confident discussion of the probable result of the coming, fight. At the evening parade, the cries of 'long live the Sultan' were given with such a strength of lung as the hills around Hadjivelekioi had never echoed to before, and the men retired to their tents to eat their— to many their last—pilaff in spirits of uproarious satisfaction with the morrow's prospect. Khourschid Pasha's (Guyon) plan was, that the army should march an hour or so after sunset, so as to have the benefit of the moonlight en route, and be ready to make the attack at early dawn. The importance of this was forcibly impressed upon the Muchir, but his evil genius—or, in plainer phrase, his stupidity could not sufficiently perceive it to secure his attention to it, and the appointed hour came, but brought no order for the troops to move. This was blunder No 1, and its fruits be seen in the sequel. 
For a novelty during the last fortnight, the night was calm and cloudless, and the moon clear and softly beautiful as any ever painted by Salvator Rosa (35) . On this side the frontier stretches out long and wide array of the Turkish white and green tents, several isolated and grass-covered mountains in the plain which leads on to Kars, and at the base of one of them the partially visible encampment of the foe. In the distance beyond lay the white towers of Gumri, vaguely discernible in the moonlight, while behind, and on either side of them rose the snow-capped hills of Georgia in sharp and prominent relief against the unclouded sky. Without the remotest attempt at fine writing or picturesque description, I may soberly say, that I have seldom looked upon a finer panorama of moon-lit scenery than was this, the quiet surface of which was so soon to be disturbed and clouded by the death-dealing thunders of a battle. 
Instead of an hour after sunset, it was midnight before the troops began their march from the camp, the first consequences of which late start being constant stumbles of the artillery and cavalry into the frequent ruts and holes which honeycomb the first portion of the line of march; horses fell, men shouted, and for a considerable time all was confusion and disorder. Torches were at length procured, and by their dim and flickering guidance more than 35,000 cavalry, infantry, and artillery, felt their way, confusedly and with difficulty, on towards the foe. Alternately marching and halting, they crept on over the plain, till the grey streaks of dawn, struggling over the mountains of Georgia, revealed a states quo as unlike as possible to the marching order of an army, and with it the still more unpleasant fact that the Russians were already awaiting us some few hundred yards ahead. After half-an-hour's delay in bringing up and arranging the scattered columns, the army was again got into motion, and the first division, under the command of Kerim Pasha, advanced to take up position in order of battle. I should have mentioned that-the avant-garde, consisting of a detached corps of-five battalions of infantry, two squadrons of irregular cavalry, and one mountain battery, had been despatched earlier in the night to take possession of the heights which command the Russian camp, and from which, on a previous occasion, the enemies' skirmishers had done considerable damage. There they were now posted, in threatening and effective contiguity to the Russian right wing. The enemy had taken up an advantageous position on a sloping eminence to the light of their camp, and numbered in all 16 battalions, with four of a reserve further back towards the tents. 
A Turkish battery of the left wing opened the ball, and after a few rounds of shot from it, which were speedily answered by the Russians, to try the range of the guns, the cannonade soon became general. For nearly half-an-hour the Russian firing was execrable; nearly every shell and shot passed high over the enemy and fell far in the rear. Afterwards, it improved, and, as I can personally vouch, generally hit with a precision which was not to be surpassed. Fine, however, as it was, the Turkish from the very first shot was better; and in little more than an hour drove the Muscovites from the advan tageous position which they occupied. Thus pressed, the right wing of the latter gradually fell back towards the base of the mountain, where a masked battery suddenly opened in their support; but a brief concentration of the Turkish fire upon this point soon silenced it, and the enemy, unable to resist the desolating shower of shot and shell poured on them by the Turkish artillerists, began to give way. I may as well remark here that neither as yet, nor up to the end of the action, did the party who held the summit of the hill fire a shot; early in the engagement the Turkish officer who commanded became non est. and Major Tevis (an American serving in the Ottoman army), next in command, urged them in vain to make a movement upon the animist rear, as was intended. Had this party acted with energy at the outset of the battle, the result might have been very different; as it was, they were merely safe spectators of the storm which raged in front and on either side below them. 
Up to this point success went steady on the side of the Turks. The right wing of the enemy was driven back, and the fiery tide rolled past the front of the mountains to where the minor conflict of musketry and lance was being waged between their left and the right of the Turks, close upon the Georgian border. (36) Here the balance turned, Resul Pasha (mentioned in a previous letter from Erzeroum in terms of confidence, which his present conduct has belied) being the first to set the example of flight. 
While opposed only by Russian infantry or cavalry, he and his Arabs stood firm enough, but on the first shot of cannon they turned and fled with an energy truly "worthy of a better cause" than cowardice. Unpursued by a single Russian, ran till far out of reach of shot or shell, and, except by the contagion of their example, had no further influence upon the fortune of the day. The "force of example," however, soon showed itself, and the regular cavalry, as on nearly every previous occasion, proved themselves no braver than the Bashi-Bazouks. Noticing the first symptoms of their wavering, Khourschid Pasha (Guyon, chief of the staff) ordered Vely Pasha, who commanded the right wing of the second division, to advance to the support of the first; but, personal jealousy being operative even then, he refused to do so without a direct order from the Commander-in-Chief. Now this latter person, being " nowhere," was not to be found till after a delay of nearly an hour, when he gallopped into sight, bareheaded (having lost his fez in the hurry of flight), in most comical alarm at having unwittingly strayed within range of a Russian gun in another part of the field. I happened to be passing the spot at the time that a shell passed over the staff and burst some 12 or 15 yards off, and I can, in all soberness, testify to the ludicrous effect upon the Generalissimo's nerves. With sudden terror blanching every feature, from his forehead to his chin, he roared "Allah '" and dug the spurs into his horse's side till the animal jumped from the ground as if attacked by a whole battery of electric eels, nor halted till safely beyond the reach of Russian metal. When he had sufficiently recovered from the ejects of this fright, the necessary order was given to the second division, which now advanced, but too late to regain the lost ground; the first was already in full retreat, pursued by two regiments of Russian dragoons, and no efforts of the Muchir could stop them. Khourschid Pasha (Guyon) sucks in arresting the flight of four battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, and with these returned to the charge. The cavalry, however, again fled, but with the infantry and artillery he drove the enemy from the heights, which they had already taken from Vely Pasha, and held them to the last. But no efforts of individual skill and bravery could now prevent the catastrophe of a defeat. Having disposed of the first division, the Russians threw their whole force on the second, which, though its infantry and artillery fought well, was barely able to maintain its ground and cover the retreat. Though numerically equal to the entire strength of the enemy, in it, as in the other division, the cavalry proved cowards almost to a man, and left the other arms to bear the brunt of all. 
Thus, after a struggle of four or five hours' duration, was the battle of Kurekdere (the name of the village nearest the scene of action) fought and lost. With a vivid impression of the whole engagement, from the first cannonshot to the last straggling discharges of musketry, I can use no language too strong to express my reprobation of the conduct of nearly four-fifths of the Turkish officers present. In accounting for the defeat of an army numbering nearly 40,000 men of all arms by a hostile force of less than one half that number, it is not sufficient to say that the management of the whole battle on the side of the Turks was a series of blunders from first to last; strategical errors might have protracted the engagement, and have added to the cost of a victory, but downright cowardice alone, which no generalship could have redeemed, gave the day to the Russians. One arm, and only one, behaved well, the artillery, which, with its commander, Tahir Pasha, acted worthily of any army in Europe. Of the whole 40 battalions of infantry two regiments, the 5th Anatolian and 4th Dessardet, alone stood their grooms and resisted cavalry. Three successive times did three squadrons of Russian dragoons bear down upon these exceptionally brave regiments, with a force before which many better disciplined troops would have yielded without effecting an opening in their ranks; and it was only after a fourth charge, supported by the fire of a field-piece, that they gave way, when only 250 of the first, and 400 of the second, escaped death from the Russian sabres. Than the conduct of the rest of the infantry nothing could well be worse, except that of the entire cavalry, which would well have disgraced the rawest Bashi-Bazouks. If such, however, was the conduct of the men, that, as I have said, of the great majority of the superior officers was still more infamous. An hour after the action began, there was hardly a Bunbashi (major) or Murallai (colonel) to be seen; almost to a man they had deserted their regiments, and fled back to the camp to secure their baggage, and send it off to Kars. Battalion upon battalion, and squadron upon squadron severe thus left without leaders—a status quo, among others, which Plainly contributed to the general confusion and ultimate defeat. In Europe the reward of such conduct is understood and certain enough; but here it has merely excited some short-lived and fruitless remark. These, however, have been the causes of defeat; the plan of the battle by Khourschid Pasha (Guyon), was admirable, but the cowardice of those with whom lay its execution would have rendered vain the strategy of Wellington himself. 
On regaining the camp after the battle I found the tents already stripped, and nearly everybody's baggage either starting or already gone to Kars. With some, the instinct of personal safety had been stronger than a regard for their chattels, and they accordingly had already fled thither, leaving cabouques, carpets, and other personalities to take care of themselves. The cannonade had drawn the Kurds in crowds down from the neighbouring mountains, like vultures to carrion, and they were now making rapid appropriations on all hands.  Having my own horses, however, I succeeded in bundling together as many of my moveables as my servant had been able to protect, and fell into the rapid stream of the retreat, which with Bashi-Bazouks, infantry, cavalry, artillery, baggage-mules, camels, and bullock-carts packed with the wounded, formed as motley and scattered a host as ever figured on panoramic canvas. From Hadjivelekioi (37) to Kars, some 18 miles, it was one unbroken stream, hurrying in quick disorder from the dreaded pursuit of the victorious Giaours; soldiers without arms, stragglers with plunder, and horses without riders, on they hastened in noisy and jostling confusion, which could find no parallel but in some similar scene. But all this was nothing when compared with the state of things at Kars itself. Even before the battle had terminated, swarms of the flying Bashi- Bazouks had already arrived, and spread the news that the whole Turkish army was destroyed, and the Russians in full march upon the devoted town. When I reached the place, therefore, I found the walls lined, not with soldiers, but women, in the wildest alarm and despair. Without yaschmacs, or face-coverings of any kind, they thronged the half-ruinous embrasures, and, with out-spread arms and dishevelled hair, uttered their apprehensive lamentations in every key the female voice can compass. Inside the town matters were equally bad; there, again, women hurried in wild and wailing disorder through the narrow streets, asking every one, who seemed to be coming from the war, "Moscov bon-lunour?" (Where are the Russians?) and, if the answer were discouraging, wringing their howls and crying, " Allah ! Allele !" Men were passing and repassing with most un-Turkish energy, hastening on sluggish bullocks or buffaloes with their " flitting," while the closely-veiled wife (or wives) and the children followed on a separate " araba" behind. These were "taking time by the forelock," and setting out for Erzeroum. In the bazaars all shops were closed and business suspended; the whole scene, indeed, was such as could only be witnessed under similar circumstances. 
To-day the public alarm seems to have in some degree abated, as scouts have brought in word that Bebutoff has not yet moved his camp. The movement towards Erzeroum, however, still continues brisk, and before 48 hours will have very considerably thinned the population of the town. The scattered and disorganized remains of the army are being reduced to order; and I hope to be able to give you, before closing this letter, a tolerably proximate report of the losses of and since yesterday. 
Aug. 8. 
The Russians still remain at the frontier, and show no intention as yet of advancing upon this. Prisoners and deserters have explained since the battle how it was that their force was so great, supposing 8,000 to have previously made a detour towards Erzeroum. Through a channel, which is more than suspected here, Bebutoff  had learnt, on the 4th, the Muchir's intention to attack him on the morning of the 6th, and at once despatched an aide-de-camp to recall the detached column. They accordingly hastened back on mules, horses, bullock carts, and every species of conveyance which could be had, and rejoined the main body only at midnight of the 5th, a few hours before the battle. But, even had they not been thus strengthened, I greatly incline to think that the cowardice which induced 40,000 to succumb to less than 20,000 would have hardly shown a braver front to 12,000. The disgrace of the defeat is too entire to receive any qualification from this. The Muchir has determined to await the enemy under the walls and behind the fieldworks of Kars. Nearly 7,000 men have this morning commenced increasing and strengthening the latter, and, as it is not likely that the Russian general, with his present small force, will attack so strong a position, present expectations here are that he will either avail reinforcements, or, as was done in 1828, fall back upon the Erzeroum side of the town, and establish a blockade. As this would effectually cut off Zarif Pasha from supplies, he would then be shut up to the alternative of fighting another battle, or of retreating on Batoum, and forming a junction sith Selim Pasha, leaving Kars for the present to other holders. I venture to predict that this latter course will be the one adopted, if the army continues under its present command. Before pausing in my letter yesterday, I might have mentioned a characteristic step which was even then begun by the Commander-in-Chief, and which he has completed to-day. Immediately after finding himself safe in Kars, he called a private gathering of all the Turkish Pashas, and procured their signatures to a petition to the Seraskier against General Guyon. This document avers that with him alone rests the blame of the defeat; as, but for him, the Muchir would not have hazarded an engagement. Now, I happen to know, from more authentic sources than one, that not once, but several times, during the two days preceding the battle, he took to himself the credit of the energetic step which was then in prospect, and spoke confidently of his beating the one division of the enemy first, and then falling back and exterminating the other. When his own incapacity in the field, and the cowardice of his officers, however, have led to a different result, he conveniently seeks to shift the blame to the shoulders of a general to whom his jealousy would not even entrust a command during the action. It is well, however, that another correspondent of the Seraskier witnessed the battle, and acknowledges the excellence of its plan. Count de Melfray, who was present as first aide-de-camp to the Muchir, will give the Porte his version of the matter, too; and if jealousy and partisanship be not as active in Constantinople as they are in Kars, it is to be hoped that this effort of falsehood will not ward off from Zarif Pasha his long since deserved from the post he now holds. But whether it do or not, I would again venture to suggest, that the state of affairs at this important point of the seat of war calls for some practical attention on the part of our own Govern ment. Russia may be repulsed on the Danube, But so long as she balances those reverses by triumphs in Asia Minor, to my humble understanding, the war is not likely to see an early or satisfactory termi nation; and, as the fight is no longer Turkey's, but the Allies', so it strikes me they should not shut their eyes to a state of things here which can only continue to bear fruit in solid advantages to the Czar. That they have done so thus far, can only be explained on the supposition of ignorance of the actual facts; but now that a commissioned informant will show up things and. men as they are, I; for one, earnestly trust that Downing-street and the Tuileries will no longer leave Asia Minor to the mercy of intriguants and imbeciles. (38)
One firm demand of the ambassadors would suffice to make this army do good service to the general cause, by rescuing it from the worse than feebleness which now rules it, and placing at its head a general whose character would command its respect, and whose thorough fitness for the post would secure its efficiency and successful action. Such a commander is on the spot; and the Emperor Nicholas has good reason to rejoice that Turkish jealousy and Polish intrigue have hitherto kept him in the background, as merely chief of the staff.  Had Guyon been in command of this army since the end of spring, not a Russian official would now have foot-room on Georgian soil. But Zarif Pasha had held that post, and the consequence is—what it is. 
I have now merely to add, that the returns, completed yesterday evenings represent the loss as 1200 killed, 1800 wounded, and 8000 missing, of which last, 2000 are prisoners, and the remainder (chiefly redifs) deserters. Among the killed is one pasha (Hassan Pasha), who commanded in the left wing of the 1st division, and of whom (regardless of the du mortuis nil nisi bonum) truth compels the remark that no greater coward fell that day. Mussa Pasha is wounded, as are several of the European and Circassian officers, all of whom (with one or two exceptions, from whom much was not to be expected) distinguished themselves highly. Tahir Pasha, already mentioned, was the only Turkish officer who behaved really well. He has been deservedly decorated; as has also Hussein Bey, a Circassian officer of the 5th regiment of Anatolia, and five others of minor rank. Of the Europeans, three—all of whom belong to the staff—are proposed for a similar distinction, Rufan Bey (Gortcriminski, who was shot through the neck), Emir Bey (Baron Schwartzenberg, who acted a distinguished part in the Hungarian war), and Nevris Bey (Major Bonfante, an American-Italian). 
Such are the incidents of a defeat which has again— for the present, and some time to come—thrown the Kars army back into a state of comparative nullity, and demonstrated, beyond the possibility of dispute, the necessity of its being at once placed under a European commander, or having - the co-operative assistance of European troops. That its continued existence as an army, to say nothing of its efficiency against the enemy, depends upon one of these conditions, is a fact which it requires no very strong force of military prevision to foresee and predict. Unless one or other of them be given to it, before two months the Russians will be in Erzeroum. 
" Nothing," says Mr. Duncan, " can be more terrible than a retreat, when the sentiments of exultation, hope, or ambition, which animate the heart in an attack, have entirely forsaken it. The hoarse cries of the wounded, the terror of the fugitives; the sullen roar of cannon, followed by the whistling of grape, which ploughed up the earth, and hurled dead to the ground victim after victim: all these circumstances were frightful; and I must confess that the happiest moment of my life was that when the Russian cavalry, collecting its prisoners, withdrew, and when the enemy's artillery, after one terrible but final discharge, slowly returned to its first position. At that moment I chanced to look behind me towards the site of the Russian encampment, and there witnessed the ascent of three red lights, which struggled with the fierce mid-day sun, and announced to the inhabitants of Gumri the triumph of the Russian army. At the same moment, a Russian band struck up a national air, which was repeated along the whole line; then a succession of loud cheers from the victorious army arose in the air, and filled my heart with rage and fury 
" On the road to the camp I encountered General Kmety, who was attempting to rally some cavalry in order to escort the remnants of the artillery of his brigade. This he effected with difficulty' so complete was the demoralisation of the Turkish army. In the action, General Kmety had displayed much judgment and intrepidity, and his brigade had at one moment driven in the Russian right living, prior to the arrival of the dragoons. (general Guyon had made frantic efforts to change the fortune of the day, but had succumbed before the dastardly conduct of the Turkish cavalry. Twice did Guyon charge at the head of the cavalry, and twice was he deserted by those troops: several times in the action he incurred great danger of falling into the hands of the enemy." 
The Eclectic Review, in its able notice of Mr. Duncan's work, has the following remarks on the dis asters of Kars and Kurekdere:— 
" The defeated army of Kars, reduced by death, sickness, and desertion, to a fourth of its foriner strength, was not pursued. Had the Russians followed up their advantage, and hurled their cavalry upon the ranks they had broken, the Turkish force might have been annihilated in Asia-Minor; but they did not even persist in a menacing attitudes. It was obvious that the military season was at an end. The Ottoman troops, instead of rallying, became more demoralised every day; the soldiers buried their dead in abject grief and shame; the officers turned round in search of a man on whom to heap the ignominy of their cowardice and incapacity. Guyon, of course, was selected, and for once some of the pashas acted in friendly concert to libel that able and gallant leader.  A document was drawn up and signed by the Muchir and his creatures, stating that all blame must be attached to General Guyon,' who was not in command, and whose advice was totally disregarded. Guyon might not have beaten the Russians, but he would not have led the Turks to irretrievable ruin. It was impossible, perhaps, that the army of Kars should have been victorious at Kurekdere. The artillery behaved well, but the cavalry charged right away from the enemy and the infantry soon fled. Most of the superior officers exposed their want of courage, and the foreign officers, who, to a man, acted heroically, had no power to retrieve, by their authority, or their example, the confusion of the day. 
'' After having, supported with exemplary fortitude the slights of the Muchir and of the native pashas, the intrigues of the Poles (39) and the sorrows of a wounded spirits poor Guyon was now doomed to experience unjust and ungenerous treatment from the authorities at Stamboul, and to drink the bitter cup of disappointment to its dregs.  All future command was denied the general, who was placed upon halfpay. Guyon is, I believes at the present moment on his way to Damascus, (40)  where, in the society of his family, let us hope that he will forget the frowns of fortune and the injustice of the world.' 
" Guyon, however, was not sacrificed to Turkish imbecility alone. Mr. Duncan does not hint at other influences of the 'malefic' kind; but it is certain that Austrian representatives have power, not only in the Divan, but in the Cabinets of Paris and London. Guyon, as a patriot of Hungary, is hated at Vienna. Consequently, every effort is made to prevent his employment in Turkey. This is not the only point in which the interests of the allies, the interests of civilisation, have been sacrificed to the malignant policy of Austria. In every direction in which great powers might be raised against the Czar, German despotism casts its ominous shade across the path; it is only now, at the eleventh hour, that the formation of an Italian or Polish legion has been countenanced by the British Government. But the allies have a great lesson to learn. Russia represents a principle, which is that of aggression, tyranny, and conquest; England and France nominally represent principles, but they have separated themselves from their constituents; they suspect and shun the liberalism of Europe; and already, by suffering Guyon to be disgraced at the instigation of the Austrian ministers, have deprived the Turks of their right arm in Asia. Let us watch the Georgian frontier; for it is the gate of Asia Minor, and through that gate Russia has, for half a century, endeavoured to possess herself of the Asiatic road to the Dardanelles. Constantinople itself is provisioned from the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus; it has no magazines, and the whole country, as far as Araba-burgas, is a waste which supplies nothing for the sustenance of the capital." 
The accompanying remarks are taken from the Morning Chronicle of Oct. 2nd, 1855, in which the honoured name of General Guyon is sufficiently vindicated: - 
" The Turkish officers have never led their soldiers into action except to certain destruction. Yet the Turkish Government have within their reach an officer from whose remarkable military qualities they have already derived signal advantage, but whom they continue to treat with unaccountable neglect. General Guyon is we believe at Constantinople, ready and anxious to take service under the Sultan; but his application is treated with cold neglect, though it is to him they are indebted for having now an army in Asia. 
" But General Guyon's reputation does not rest upon his Turkish services In the Hungarian insurrection, among the military chiefs whose names were made familiar to Western Europe by their daring gallantry, next to that of the gallant Bem, there was none more conspicuous than Guyon; and Bem himself, with that generous disinterestedness which bespeaks the true soldier, was always eloquent in praise of Guyon, and predicted of him that he would one day be recognised as the first cavalry officer in Europe. Even the cold and sneering Görgey, who has not an honourable word to say for any of his comrades in arms, is constrained to admit—and the ungraciousness of the admission enhances the praise—that Guyon's bravery shone conspicuous amidst the deeds of many brave men. It is, in fact, to his gallantry in that war that General Guyon now owes the neglect with which he is treated. 
  "There was one way, indeed, in which the general might have disarmed native prejudices, and eluded the vengeance of foreigners. Had he chosen to follow the infamous example which had been set by other military chiefs—had he apostatised from the Christian faith, and professed to believe in Mahomet—there can be no doubt that he might have been at this time high in command. But this was a course which his honest, upright, and transparent nature disdained to follow. He could not stoop to hypocrisy—he is, therefore, left to neglect, while others, inferior to him, but of more pliant natures, are elevated to high command. 
" But we doubt whether under any circumstances -the Turkish service would have been the most fitting for this gallant officer. In the general system of corruption that, we are assured, prevails in an ranks of such service, we fear that General Guyon would have never found himself easy; his frank and impetuous nature would be sure to bring him into almost daily collision with one or other of those pashas, that act like so many horse-leeches upon the Turkish finances. But there is one service in which General Guyon would have found his proper place, and we must confess our astonishment that he has not, long ere this, been employed. General Guyon is an Englishman by birth, and the fact that he has spent so large a portion of his life in foreign countries only marks him out as the more desirable officer for one or other of the foreign Contingents which we have lately been raising. Speaking with fluency both the Turkish and German languages, he would have been an invaluable acquisition either to the Turkish Contingent or to the German Legion we have spent so much money and time in organising; while the fame of his achievements, familiar as they are to the inhabitants of both countries, would have brought many a daring spirit to his standard. 
"We are the more astonished at the neglect which General Guyon has experienced at the hands of our own Government, when we remember what took place in the house of Commons so lately as July last. In answer to a question from Colonel Herbert, the active and intelligent member for Kerry, Lord Palmerston passed a warm eulogium on the military character and services of General Guyon, and stated the pleasure it would give to Her Majesty's Government if the services of that gallant officer were employed against the Russians. After that, one would have thought that Her Majesty's Government would have been too happy to have made use of the services of an officer whose military experience is so extensive, whose career in arms has beers so brilliant, and whose qualifications to command foreigners are so rare. Other officers, of whose general merits we have not a depreciatory word to say, but whose experience it would be absurd to compare for a moment with that of General Guyon, have been preferred before him. Can our Government, too, be under Austrian influence ?" 
The Examiner, of Nov. 10, 1855, remarking on the recent victory of Kars, says, " We cannot but express our regret that the name of our countryman General Guyon should not be mentioned in conjunction with so glorious and important a victory. The organisation of the army in Kars was in a great degree due to him; and the impetuous valour which forced one of the most difficult passes in Europe against a superior force of Austrians, would surely have found apt employment in leading the brave garrison and citizens of Kars against the common enemies of Turkey and Hungary." 
The Spectator, of Nov. 10, 1855, in noticing the comment in the United Service Magazine, on the neglectful treatment of Sir John Burgoyne, and other military worthies, observes, that General Guyon, who had done good service in the present war, still remains at Constantinople without employment, and without any share of the honours so plenteously distributed. General Guyon's case is indeed a hard one. Although the resuscitation of the Turkish army in Asia and the fortifications of Kars are in a great measure due to him, yet, because Zarif :Pasha's blunders in 1854 destroyed the Turkish army, and led to the rout at Kurekdere, General Guyon has been suspended from all employment. Had Guyon's plans been followed, it is probable that Prince Bebutoff would have been defeated. But the Turkish intrigues threw the blame on Guyon, and there is reason to believe that the influence of Austria at Constantinople has contributed to keep him in obscurity. Now, that other heroes of the Kars army are brought before the public, let us not forget this one, who laid some of the foundations of their triumphs

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